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ABSTRACT—Since William Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, the
Supreme Court has been aggressively activist in narrowing, undermining, or
effectively nullifying an array of statutes—in particular the vast edifice of
regulatory, safety net, and civil rights laws enacted by both the federal and
state governments since the early twentieth-century dawn of progressive
government. The conservative bloc of Justices have developed a formidable
arsenal of largely nonconstitutional techniques for limiting the reach and
impact of progressive statutes, blunting or neutralizing the intent and
purpose of the legislatures that enacted them, elevating the Court’s power
vis-à-vis both Congress and state legislatures, and, even, impeding
Congress’ practical capacity to carry out its legislative function. Justice
Stevens was consistently alert to this “continuing campaign,” spotlighting
its excesses and countering its designs. Over and over, Justice Stevens
called out his conservative colleagues for “unabashed law-making,” and for
“skewed interpretations” that impose “its own policy preferences,” “defeat
the purpose for which a provision was enacted,” and “ignore the interest of
unrepresented” constituencies whom statutes were enacted to protect. This
Article considers the conservatives’ methodological approaches together, as
elements of a campaign to constrain twentieth- and twenty-first-century
progressive legislation. Originally submitted for publication in September
2011, prior to the start of the Court’s 2011–2012 term, the Article forecast
that cases likely to be decided by the end of that term (completed on June
28, 2012) would test whether the conservative bloc is prepared to ratchet up
its hostility to progressive legislation, and more aggressively invalidate
such laws as unconstitutional, rather than simply restrict their application.
AUTHOR—Senior Counsel, Constitutional Accountability Center. This
Article was prepared for a Northwestern University Law Review symposium
on Justice Stevens’s legacy. The in-person phase of the symposium
occurred at Northwestern University School of Law on May 12, 2011. I am
grateful to my colleague Rochelle Bobroff for generous and valuable
contributions to this draft, to my colleague Doug Kendall, Alan Morrison,
and Patricia Wald for astute suggestions, and to Nate Vogel for research
assistance. All responsibility for the product is, obviously, mine.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Justice Stevens has said that he wound up the leader of the Supreme
Court’s “liberal” bloc not because he moved to the left, but because the
Court moved to the right.1 The main, public debate over the right–left divide
to which he referred focuses on the Court’s hot-button constitutional,
primarily “culture war” issues—such as sexual privacy, affirmative action
and minority preferences, and political and civil rights. These items on the
Court’s agenda dominated media, political, and public attention during his
thirty-five-year term. But there is another side to that history. This is the
Court’s application of statutes, in particular the vast edifice of regulatory,
safety net, and civil rights laws enacted by both the federal and state
governments since the early-twentieth-century dawn of progressive
government. Questions about the interpretation and enforcement of these
categories of laws (hereinafter termed “progressive statutes”) have and
continue to occupy much more of the Court’s caseload, affect Americans’
daily lives far more, and implicate the Constitution and the Court’s
constitutional role at least as much as higher visibility constitutional
controversies. Since William Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, the
Court has been aggressively activist in narrowing, undermining, or
effectively nullifying an array of progressive statutes.
For the past quarter century, Justice Stevens has been alert to this
“continuing campaign,”2 spotlighting its excesses and countering its
designs. He has done so more persistently than any of his colleagues, or for
that matter, more than any observer in Congress, academia, or progressive
advocacy circles. Over and over, Justice Stevens called out the conservative
bloc for “unabashed . . . law-making,”3 and “skew[ed] . . . interpretation[s]”4
that impose “[their] own policy preferences, . . . defeat the very purpose for
which a provision was enacted,”5 and “ignore[] the interest of the
unrepresented”6 constituencies that statutes were enacted to protect. He
recognized this “kind of judicial activism [as] . . . such a radical departure
1

Interview by Jeffrey Rosen with Justice John Paul Stevens, in Washington, D.C. (June 22, 2007),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/magazine/12stevens-interview.html?adxnnl=1&
adxnnlx=1313111018-oaHOH9qJKM1mqkG+jZe8ng&pagewanted=all (“I think I have not deviated
very far from the views I expressed at the time, although people always said I was a surprise. I think I
really have been very consistent with the views that I expressed on the Court of Appeals, and every now
and then issues come up that I had on the Seventh Circuit, and they’re amazingly similar. What
changed? Was it the court that changed or the country? No, the court. There’s no doubt about the
fact . . . It’s a tremendous change in the law. And that’s different justices.” (omission in original) (first
emphasis indicates question asked by reporter)).
2
Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 175 (2008) (Stevens J.,
dissenting).
3
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
5
Id.
6
Id.
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from the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the
opportunity arises.”7 And he never shrank from acting on that recognition,
with eloquence but also with the professional and strategic craft for which
he is renowned on all sides.
During the Rehnquist Court’s early years, voting over these statutory
issues did not always break down into rigid right–left patterns. But over
time, these statutory interpretation issues have increasingly provoked the
same 5–4 ideological and partisan splits typical of constitutional culture war
cases. To be sure, the Court, including the conservative Justices, has not
been hostile to individuals seeking to enforce progressive laws in every
single such case to come before them. And, at least up until now, the
Court’s conservative members have largely supported the principal
constitutional bases relied upon by Congress and state legislatures to enact
twentieth-century progressive legislation (i.e., broad construction of
Congress’s commerce, tax-and-spend, and necessary and proper powers)
coupled with strict construction of substantive due process limits on those
powers.8 Simultaneously, however, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have
developed a formidable arsenal of largely nonconstitutional techniques for
limiting the reach and impact of progressive statutes, blunting or
neutralizing the intent and purpose of the legislatures that enacted them,
elevating the Court’s power vis-à-vis both Congress and state legislatures,
and even impeding Congress’s practical capacity to carry out its legislative
function. All this has been done with little attention from the media.
Significantly, the Court’s self-aggrandizing conduct has received
inconsistent and infrequent notice or pushback from Congress itself or from
progressive advocacy communities. In this respect, Congress’s indifference
to the Court’s power grabbing has paralleled its simultaneous, though far
more widely noticed, cession of turf and clout to the Executive Branch.
The conservative Justices have fashioned for themselves a broad
selection of doctrinal monkey wrenches to throw into the machinery of the
modern progressive state. These are summarized immediately below and
more fully outlined in Parts II–V in the body of the Article:
1. Interpretive approaches that “turn[] . . . laws on their heads,” as Senator
Patrick Leahy put it in a June 2008 Judiciary Committee hearing.9
7

Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98–99 (2000).
Simon Lazarus, The Health Care Lawsuits: Unraveling a Century of Constitutional Law and the
Fabric of Modern American Government, ACS ISSUE BRIEF 4–9 (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/lazarus_-_health_reform_lawsuits_0.pdf.
Chief
Justice
Marshall’s broad definition has not been fundamentally challenged by conservative Justices appointed
by twentieth and twenty-first century Republican presidents, up to this point at least, with the exception
of Justice Clarence Thomas. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
9
Short-Change for Consumers and Short-Shrift for Congress? The Supreme Court’s Treatment of
Laws that Protect Americans’ Health, Safety, Jobs and Retirement Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 [hereinafter Short-Change for Consumers] (2008) (statement of Sen. Patrick J.
8
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Leahy was referencing the conservative bloc’s penchant for pulling
individual statutory terms and provisions out of context, analyzing them
in isolation, and imposing interpretations that ignore and flat-out
contradict the purposes Congress enacted them to achieve.10 These
techniques, which mainly fly under the banner of an idiosyncratic and
tendentious brand of “textualism,” include:
•
•

Excluding consideration of all forms of legislative history,
regardless of how reliable or authoritative.
Arbitrary rejection of congressional findings from
investigations and hearings, even in committee reports or
when codified in the statute under review.

As Justice Stevens observed in one of many critiques of the
conservatives’ “[p]laying ostrich”11 with contextual indicia of statutory
meaning, “[a] method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately
uninformed, and hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is
consistent with a court’s own views of how things should be, but it may
also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted.”12
2. Judicially prescribed substantive policies embedded in interpretive
presumptions, canons, or other less formally defined approaches that
expressly trump the meaning and evident purpose of statutes. Some of
these are loosely connected to allegedly implicit constitutional
“postulates” or “presuppositions.” Some are simply asserted with no
purported link to legal authority. These include:
•

“Super-strong clear statement rules,” a term coined by
Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey.13
Traditionally, clear statement rules require courts to apply a
rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend an
interpretation of a statutory provision that would transgress
some well-established norm or convention, in the absence of a
clear congressional statement endorsing such an
interpretation.14 In practice, super-strong versions are precisely
the opposite of genuine clear statement requirements; they
contravene and trump the meaning of statutory terms, even

Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis? Progressives’ Quest to
Reclaim the Constitution and the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1206–07 (2011).
10
See Short-Change for Consumers, supra note 9, at 1–3.
11
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12
Id. at 133.
13
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992).
14
See, e.g., id. at 598–611.
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•
•

when that meaning and Congress’s purpose in enacting them is
in fact clear.
Obstructing and eliminating private rights of action to enforce
statutory rights. This theme runs through many of the
conservative Justices’ interpretive approaches.
A one-sided caricature of “federalism” that equates federalism
exclusively with devolving power to the states. In fact, the
actual design of the Framers—of the 1789 Constitution as well
as its major amendments—contemplated significant federal no
less than state roles, in particular, vesting robusteconomic,
national security, taxing-and-spending, and liberty-securing
authority in the federal government.

3. Arrogation to the federal judiciary of roving authority to invalidate state
as well as federal regulatory laws and common law remedies. The
conservative Justices have elaborated two approaches to this end, each
having scant basis in the federal statutes from which they purport to
derive authority:
•

•

15

Aggressive deployment of Supremacy Clause-based
“preemption” authority to strike down state regulatory laws in
cases generally brought by businesses. Under Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s tenure, from 1986 to 2004, preemption cases
accounted for a staggering 8% of the Court’s civil docket,
according to the American Enterprise Institute.15
Transmutation of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) into
a platform for immunizing businesses from private remedies
under federal and state laws protecting customers, retirees,
depositors,
workers,
and
other
individuals.
The
Frankensteinian reach of the judicially revamped FAA bears
no relationship to the modest scope delineated by the text and
legislative history of the law.16

Out of 1302 civil cases decided by the Rehnquist Court during this period, 105 were preemption
cases. Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical
Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 50, 61 n.42 (2006).
16
As developed below in Part IV.B (and exhaustively demonstrated in dissenting opinions by
Justice Stevens), the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was originally understood simply to require federal
judges (who, in 1925, tended toward hostility to nonlitigative alternatives to dispute resolution) to
uphold consensual provisions in commercial agreements between commercial enterprises (with
equivalent bargaining power) to submit contractual disputes to arbitration before or in lieu of seeking
judicial resolution. The modern Supreme Court has reshaped this modest measure into what former
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor called “an edifice of its own creation.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). This made-up construct extends the FAA
to contracts of adhesion between large organizations and individual workers, customers, and the like;
invalidates all federal and state laws prescribing the option of judicial remedies for particular types of
law violations or in particular types of circumstances for equitable reasons; and bars state or federal
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4. Hamstringing Congress. The conservative Justices have not only
reached out to undermine or nullify specific statutes but have done so in
ways that weaken Congress as an institution and impair its practical
ability to function. As former New York Times Supreme Court
correspondent Linda Greenhouse observed, “The exercise of power is
largely a zero-sum game, and the court, defining the rules of
engagement to give itself the last word, is winning at the expense of
Congress.”17 Examples include:
•

•

•

•

Dictating unworkable internal legislative procedures and
organizational arrangements. In particular, thwarting
Congress’s ability to delegate responsibilities to committees
and staff with specialized expertise and adopt their products
and conclusions.
Disabling Congress from shaping legislation with confidence
that its well-founded judgments will endure the gauntlet of
judicial review. Such is the natural consequence of the
conservative bloc’s increasingly apparent readiness, noted
above, to ignore, distort, and spurn congressional factual
findings, policy choices based on them, and efforts to provide
guidance to courts.
Moving the goal posts. In general, the conservative Justices
have shown no compunction about blindsiding Congress by
changing interpretive approaches retroactively—and even
serially.
Brushing aside corrective legislation that overrides the Court’s
misinterpretations and continuing to treat overridden decisions
and their rationales as binding precedents, except in the
precise circumstances of the particular discredited decision.

Simply skimming the above summary suggests the breadth and depth
of logical contradictions within and among these doctrinal initiatives. Quite
evidently, the tissue connecting these disparate elements of the Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts’ statutory interpretive repertoire is the type of political
and policy results they generate, not their jurisprudential kinship. For
example, contrast the conservative Justices’ hospitality to business plaintiffs
seeking preemption of state regulatory laws, noted above, with their
sensitivity to state autonomy and “dignity” implicit in what American
Enterprise Institute scholar Michael Greve has candidly called the
“antientitlement doctrines” (also noted above) that obstruct civil rights and
legislators, courts, or even arbitrators, from imposing minimum fairness requirements for arbitration
(such as provisions for collective arbitration of disputes suitable for class treatment) that could threaten
business interests enough to disincentivize businesses from opting for arbitration over litigation. See
infra Part IV.B.
17
Linda Greenhouse, The High Court’s Target: Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, at WK3.
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safety net plaintiffs suing state governments.18 Professor Ernest Young has
observed that driving this two-faced regime is a “libertarian vision” that
“sees federalism as a tool of deregulation with the potential to keep both
national and state governments within relatively narrow bounds.”19
In the same vein, all these conservative approaches to interpreting
statutes conflict with the credo of “originalism,” embraced by many of the
same conservatives when they turn to interpreting the Constitution. When
toggling between interpreting statutory text and interpreting constitutional
text, conservatives execute a remarkable 180-degree reversal. On
constitutional questions, conservative originalists’ priority is confining the
sweeping language of the document itself by looking outside the text for the
meaning “originally” contemplated by those who enacted it (i.e., the
drafters, legislators, and ratifiers).20 In contrast, conservative textualism for
interpreting statutes frowns on or outright bars consideration of extrinsic
evidence of the context in which statutory provisions were enacted,
especially any indications of the purpose or meaning “originally” attached
to them by those responsible for enactment.21
Why this contradiction? It is hard to resist surmising that modern
conservatives feel comfortable deferring to eighteenth-century legislators
and voters whose policy preferences they project as constrained by the
government-enforced racial, class, ethnic, and gender homogeneity of
political participants in that era. In contrast, conservatives may well feel—
indeed, they betray—acute discomfort with the orientation of the
legislatures (and political constituencies) responsible for the reforms of the
Progressive, New Deal, Great Society, and more recent eras. At a
minimum, the conservative Justices, seeming to mirror conservative
academics’ jaundiced “public choice theory” perspective on modern
18

See Michael S. Greve, Federalism, Yes. Activism, No., FEDERALIST OUTLOOK 3 (July 2001),
http://www.aei.org/files/2001/07/01/Federalism Yes- Activism No.pdf.
19
Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’
POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 249 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
20
Conservatives’ use of constitutional originalism is, as has been widely noted, selective. See
generally infra Part III.D (describing the late 1990’s “federalism” campaign); see also James E. Ryan,
Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2011)
(describing the transition from “originalism” to “new textualism” and the subsequent shift to a focus on
statutory and constitutional text).
21
This contradiction is noted and discussed in Professor Ronald Dworkin’s comment on Justice
Scalia’s essay, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997). Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra, at 115. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme
Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1302
(1998) (“The puzzle posed by this Article is that the new textualists, particularly Justice Scalia, refuse to
consider the debating history of statutes as relevant context but do consider such history of the
Constitution and its amendments, sometimes in great detail.”).
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democratic pluralist institutions, have revealed ignorance, distaste, and
intense disapproval of Congress and the legislative process. Beneath the
densely technical weeds one must untangle to fully explicate these doctrinal
initiatives, they share roots in familiar conservative policy, ideological, and
political precepts.22
In all events, the conservative Justices are aware that, although
superficially granular, these issues of statutory interpretation are at least as
significant as higher visibility constitutional issues. As Justice Scalia has
observed, “By far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is to
interpret the meaning of federal statutes and agency regulations . . . [which
is] the principal business of judges and (hence) lawyers.”23 On this point, he
and his allies have a better grasp than many of their progressive adversaries,
who have tended to treat statutory issues as comparatively insignificant or
to virtually ignore them.24 And not only do the conservatives’ statutory
interpretation techniques often have more practical impact than their
treatment of constitutional questions, but their purportedly
nonconstitutional interpretive doctrines are also, in important instances,
implicitly constitutional themselves; as Professors Frickey and Eskridge
have observed, the conservatives’ statutory jurisprudence becomes in some
cases “a ‘backdoor’ version of the constitutional activism that most
Justices . . . have publicly denounced.”25
The 2011–2012 term will throw light on whether, going forward, the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts will start giving vent to
such ideologically driven activism on broad questions of Congress’s
constitutional authority, as well as on “backdoor” statutory interpretation
22

As noted below in Part V, the ideological agenda behind contemporary conservatives’ statutory
interpretation techniques is underscored by the fact that the Office of Legal Policy in President Ronald
Reagan’s Justice Department issued a 123-page report to the Attorney General endorsing Justice
Scalia’s textualism. The report’s analysis is freighted with public choice theory notions, echoing Justice
Scalia, that the congressional process is dominated by “intrigue” and “hidden deals” that interpretive
approaches that ignore legislative purpose and history can mitigate. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A
RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 29–30, nn.
112–13 (1989).
23
Scalia, supra note 21, at 13–14. Justice Scalia estimated that “less than a twentieth” of the
Supreme Court’s docket involves constitutional issues (excluding criminal cases). Id. at 13. Justice
Scalia is—commendably—far more appreciative of the comparative importance of statutory
interpretation than many of his progressive critics. Revealingly, while the dominant focus of progressive
commentators on this seminal essay is his exposition of the precepts of originalist constitutional
interpretation, the first thirty-four pages of the essay elaborate his views of statutory interpretation, and
only the remaining ten pages target constitutional interpretation methodology. See id. at 3–47.
24
For example, Justice Scalia’s ten-page exposition of constitutional originalism concluding his
essay in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION is the target of a truly vast literature written by progressive
critics. They tend to identify that as the principal or the only subject of the essay, even though his
constitutional argument is preceded by a thirty-four-page elaboration of his textualist statutory
interpretation credo.
25
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 598.
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issues. By the end of this term the Court will have ruled on pending
challenges to the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act’s (ACA) “individual mandate” to carry health insurance or pay a
tax penalty.26 As President Reagan’s Solicitor General Charles Fried has
testified, the Court cannot strike down the ACA mandate without scuttling
precedents reaching back to Chief Justice John Marshall’s foundational
decisions and reaffirmed as recently as the 2009–2010 term.27 The
principles established by these decisions require broad judicial deference to
Congress’s exercise of its powers to regulate commerce, to tax and spend
for the general welfare, and, especially, to “allow to the national legislature
that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers [the
Constitution] confers are to be carried into execution.”28 If, when
contemplating the signature legislative accomplishment of President Barack
Obama and the Democratic 111th Congress, the conservative Justices feel
inclined to sideline restraint and let ideology trump precedent, their
statutory jurisprudence provides a roadmap of how they will go about that
enterprise. Such a result will ratchet up pre-New Deal “Lochneresque”
activism—already rampant on statutory issues—to the constitutional “front
door,” with historic implications for the distribution of power to set twentyfirst-century domestic policy as well as its content.29
Justice Stevens consistently targeted all his conservative colleagues’
challenges to progressive statutes and the threat they pose to the role of
Congress and state legislatures in the democratic process. This area of his
jurisprudence should rank among the most important elements of his
legacy. His successors on the Court and his admirers off the Court should

26

Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242–49 (2010) (creating I.R.C. § 5000A,
“Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Health Coverage”). Pleadings and decisions in the
multiple cases challenging the mandate and other provisions of the ACA are collected and continuously
updated on a blog managed by Professor Brad Joondeph of Santa Clara University. Brad Joondeph,
ACA LITIG. BLOG, http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com (last visited June 20, 2012).
27
The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter ACA Hearing] (testimony of Prof. Charles Fried), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-02 Fried Testimony.pdf.
28
Id. at 3 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)) (emphasis added).
Professor Fried notes that the broad latitude that judges must give to Congress’s choice of means was
most recently reaffirmed by Justice Scalia, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment), and Chief Justice Roberts, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949,
1965 (2010) (joining majority opinion).
29
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), launched and has come to symbolize the notoriously
activist antiregulatory regime of the first third of the twentieth century. I have elaborated the reasons
why, doctrinally, a decision to invalidate the ACA individual mandate will necessarily restore the
substantive logic as well as the spirit of the jurisprudence of that era, in an issue brief for the American
Constitution Society. Lazarus, supra note 8. See also a briefer account: Simon Lazarus, Jurisprudential
Shell Game: Health Reform Lawsuits Sneak “Lochnerism” Back from Constitutional Exile, NAT’L L.J.,
Dec. 20, 2010, at 39.
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devote priority attention to carrying forward his commitment to keeping the
Court in its democratic place.
Scholars, including participants in this symposium, have spotlighted,
catalogued, debated, and brilliantly critiqued various of these doctrinal
theories and initiatives. This Article considers them together as elements of
a campaign bent on constraining the impact of twentieth- and twenty-firstcentury progressive legislation. Part I briefly outlines the three-part “big
picture” strategic agenda of the conservative Justices and their allies; their
approach to statutory interpretation forms one of the three components.
Part II considers conservatives’ “textualist” approach to interpreting
individual statutes. Part III considers interpretational devices and doctrines
that expressly empower federal judges to contravene statutory text and
intended meaning. Part IV considers doctrinal initiatives that conservatives
have devised to invalidate state as well as federal progressive statutes.
Part V considers steps the conservative majority has taken that do not
simply undermine or nullify individual laws, but weaken Congress as an
institution and impair its capacity to perform its constitutional functions.
I.

THE CONSERVATIVE JUSTICES’ THREE-PART STRATEGIC AGENDA
UNDER CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
From a big-picture vantage point, the new brand of ideologically
conservative Supreme Court Justices named by Presidents Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush have pursued a strategic agenda with
three components. The first of these generated the attention-grabbing
controversies during the Rehnquist and Roberts years. As noted above,
these issues have involved constitutional questions on various fronts of the
nation’s culture wars. Here, the goal of the conservative Justices and their
allies off the Court was to limit or overrule Warren and Burger Court
decisions and doctrines that had expanded individual and minority rights
under the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment—as noted above,
decisions affecting sexual privacy, racial preferences and affirmative action,
and political and civil rights, especially including religious autonomy.30
To justify an agenda that consisted of disrespecting and, in many cases,
overturning established precedent, conservative legal thought-leaders
recognized that they needed a principled jurisprudential basis. To meet that
need, they developed an approach to interpreting the Constitution, which

30

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980–81 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The states may, if they wish, permit abortion
on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so.”); Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R.
Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 1111, 1117 (1994) (“The evident conservatism in the judicial philosophies of the five appointees
reflected the conscious efforts of the Reagan and Bush administrations to pack the Supreme Court with
Justices who would undo the objectionable liberal decisions of the preceding three decades.”).
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they labeled “originalism.”31 Originalism, they claimed, was the only
legitimate way to determine what constitutional provisions mean and how
they should be applied.32 This interpretive credo held that, while the
provisions undergirding the midcentury rights-expanding decisions were,
indeed, broad and vague enough to permit modern liberal interpretations,
these decisions were nevertheless incorrect and, indeed, illegitimate. This
was because the correct interpretation of constitutional provisions had to be,
as initially propounded by conservative theorists, that intended by their
Framers (“original intention”), or, as subsequently modified, that
understood by the public that ratified it (“original understanding” or
“original meaning”).33 As stated by Justice Scalia, “[P]articularly in the past
thirty-five years, the ‘evolving’ Constitution has imposed a vast array of
new constraints [on government].”34 Justice Scalia lists a few examples of
these new “constraints,” all of which expand individual and minority rights
protections in progressive directions, which in his view flout the relevant
provisions’ original meanings.35
From an operational standpoint, in either the original intention or the
original meaning package—often more distinguishable in principle than in
practice—conservative constitutional interpretive methodology has the
same content: its premise is that while in principle legal text is necessarily
the starting point for analysis and interpretation, constitutional text is often
or usually ambiguous and could logically justify multiple interpretations,
potentially including modern liberal interpretations.36 The next step is their
claim that only the “original” understanding, meaning, or interpretation can
be correct or legitimate.37 Finally, to find that original meaning and
31

Scalia, supra note 21, at 38.
Id.
33
The shift from “a jurisprudence of ‘original intention’” to one of “original meaning” is recounted
by several observers, most recently and comprehensively by James Ryan of the University of Virginia.
See Ryan, supra note 20, at 1525, 1530 (“Conservatives generally abandoned original intent in favor of
original meaning.”).
34
Scalia, supra note 21, at 41.
35
Id. at 41–42. Justice Scalia’s examples of “things that formerly could be done or not done, as the
society desired, but now cannot be done” are:
admitting in a state criminal trial evidence of guilt that was obtained by an unlawful search;
permitting invocation of God at public-school graduations; electing one of the two houses of a
state legislature the way the United States Senate is elected, i.e., on a basis that does not give all
voters numerically equal representation; terminating welfare payments as soon as evidence of
fraud is received, subject to restoration after hearing if the evidence is satisfactorily refuted;
imposing property requirements as a condition of voting; prohibiting anonymous campaign
literature; prohibiting pornography.
Id. (footnotes omitted). At another point in the volume, Justice Scalia added some additional examples
of new rights created by the Warren and Burger Courts that are incompatible, in his view, with original
meaning analysis—all decisions generally favored by progressives and opposed by conservatives.
Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 21, at 139.
36
Scalia, supra note 21, at 38.
37
Id.
32
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determine what the law “actually” is, the conservatives’ interpretive
enterprise concludes by looking to contemporaneous sources outside the
text—dictionaries, records of the Constitutional Convention and the
Congresses that drafted amendments, materials from the ratification
debates, especially, of course, the Federalist Papers, and, frequently,
societal practice—to uncover the original understanding attached to the text
by Framers, ratifiers, and contemporary opinion shapers.38
While condemning mid-twentieth-century expansion of individual and
minority constitutional rights as “liberal judicial activism,” mainstream
conservatives nevertheless emphatically endorsed a second component of
modern liberal constitutional jurisprudence: post-New Deal Supreme Court
precedents that broadly construed Congress’s constitutional authority to
enact progressive legislation pursuant to the Commerce, “General Welfare”
(taxing and spending authority), and Necessary and Proper Clauses.39
Indeed, leading legal conservatives such as Robert Bork, Justice Scalia, and
Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese condemned pre-New Deal
“conservative activism” no less than contemporary liberal activism.40 To be
sure, throughout the Rehnquist–Roberts years, a cadre of libertarian legal
intellectuals vigorously promoted a more radical and far-reaching brand of
originalism, which considered the entire fabric of twentieth-century
regulatory, tax, and spending legislation incompatible with the original
meaning of the Constitution. These libertarians advocated activist decisions

38

See Scalia, supra note 21, at 38, 41–47 (stating that he will “consult” THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
because its authors were typical “intelligent and informed people of the time, [whose writings] display
how the text of the Constitution was originally understood,” and arguing on the basis of such extrinsic
evidence that broad constitutional provisions such as the First Amendment’s protection of “freedom of
speech” and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “equal protection of the laws” should be
confined in accordance with extrinsic contemporaneous practices and writings); Robert H. Bork, The
Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 828 (1986) (noting that
an “intentionalist” judge should study the “evidence”—i.e., sources extrinsic to the text—to determine
whether equal protection of the laws, though it literally could be read to ban myriad forms of
discrimination, should apply only to discrimination against African-Americans, or only to racial
discrimination, but not discrimination on the basis of gender or disability or religion, for example).
39
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause and Commerce Clause give Congress the power to
regulate “intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce”).
40
Lazarus, supra note 8, at 4 (“[W]hile Bork and the generation of conservative constitutionalists
for whom he spoke condemned the ‘activism’ of the Warren Court . . . they also called the ‘activist
Court of the Lochner era . . . as illegitimate as the Warren Court,’ and endorsed the post-New Deal
postulate of judicial deference to Congress on economic regulatory matters.” (second omission in
original) (quoting Edwin Meese)); CMTY. RIGHTS COUNSEL & EARTHJUSTICE, JANICE ROGERS BROWN
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A DANGEROUS CHOICE FOR A CRITICAL COURT 2 (2003), available at http://
www.communityrights.org/PDFs/BrownReport.pdf (“Virtually every prominent constitutional scholar—
from the left, the center, and the right—agrees that Lochner is a paradigmatic example of
unconscionable judicial activism.”).

781

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

to enforce that meaning.41 But, at least until 2010, when Republicans filed
legal challenges to the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, the
libertarian view remained marginalized among legal conservatives,
especially judges and politicians.42
Hence, as the second component of their agenda, conservatives no less
than liberals rested their constitutional vision on the post-New Deal premise
that the default posture for federal judges handling challenges to laws,
especially federal laws, was restraint and deference, with the exception of
cases involving “fundamental” individual rights or oppression of “insular
minorities” unable to vindicate their rights through the political process.43
The principal difference between liberals and conservatives lay in their
respective approaches to applying the fundamental rights/insular minorities
exception to the general rule of judicial restraint; in conservatives’ view, the
judicial progressives on the Warren, Burger, and subsequent Courts
overstretched that exception.
However, while not contesting—indeed, endorsing—the fundamental
precedents and principles empowering Congress and state legislatures to
enact statutes directed toward progressive ends, Rehnquist–Roberts Court
conservatives frequently gave the statutes themselves a chilly reception
when opportunities arose to interpret and apply them. In such cases, the
Justices have often betrayed skepticism and even hostility toward the
progressive purposes that drove legislators to enact them and even toward
the legislators themselves. As the third component of their agenda, the
conservative Justices have, as noted above, developed a panoply of
techniques for narrowing, undermining, and nullifying progressive statutes.
The techniques are many and varied, but they have one common basic
attribute: to a greater or lesser extent, implicitly or expressly, they empower
or even require judges to ignore, blunt, nullify, or reject outright the
purposes and understandings that legislators, experts, constituents, the
media, and the public attached to statutory provisions under review—

41

See Damon W. Root, Conservatives v. Libertarians: The Debate over Judicial Activism Divides
Former Allies, FREE REPUBLIC (June 8, 2010 7:07 PM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/2530504/posts (June 8, 2010) (describing the divisions among conservatives and libertarians about
whether judicial activism is a legitimate tool to promote right wing political goals).
42
See id. On the Court itself, only Justice Clarence Thomas appeared to subscribe to libertarian
dissent from acceptance of progressive legislation in the name of judicial restraint. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 596 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am aware of no cases prior to the New
Deal that characterized the power flowing from the Commerce Clause as sweepingly as does our
substantial effects test. My review of the case law indicates that the substantial effects test is but an
innovation of the 20th century.”).
43
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S 144, 152 (1938) (“[T]he existence of facts
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”).
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precisely the opposite of the tack conservative originalism commands for
interpreting the Constitution.
In the remaining four sections of this Article, I will attempt to pull this
array of doctrinal initiatives together, highlight their common aims and
effects, underscore their practical impact and jurisprudential significance,
and sketch what a more comprehensive examination might involve.
II. “TURNING LAWS ON THEIR HEADS”:
CONSERVATIVES’ TEXT-OUT-OF-CONTEXT “TEXTUALISM”
As noted above, in June 2008, Senate Judiciary Committee Chair
Patrick Leahy launched a series of hearings that continued into 2011,
spotlighting the impact of Supreme Court decisions on “Americans’
everyday lives”44 and pocketbook issues such as health care coverage;
retirement uncertainty; and credit card, home mortgage, and other monthly
payments. In his opening statement, Leahy observed: “Congress has passed
laws to protect Americans in many of these areas, but in many cases, the
Supreme Court, I believe, has ignored the intent of Congress, . . . sometimes
turning these laws on their heads and making them protections for big
business rather than of ordinary citizens.”45
A. “Textualism” According to Justice Scalia and His Followers
The cases targeted by Senator Leahy’s ire exemplify how the
Rehnquist–Roberts Court conservatives apply their network of statutory
interpretational doctrines, in particular the principal building block of those
doctrines, a theory its proponents label “textualism.” This theory originated
in the opinions of Justice Scalia when he was on the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit and in his early days on the Supreme
Court.46 Its gist is that, in interpreting individual statutory provisions, judges
must focus on their actual words—exclusively, with rare exceptions—
independent of and rather than attempting to connect the words to, or
understand them in light of, Congress’s “intent” or the “purposes” driving
their enactment. As Justice Scalia put it, in the course of acknowledging
charges that his textualism leads to blinkered decisions that ignore or defeat
the manifest aims of legislation: “To be a textualist in good standing, one
need not be too dull to perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is
designed, or could be designed, to serve . . . . One need only hold the belief
that judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes . . . .”47 “I
44

See Short-Change for Consumers, supra note 9, at 1.
Id.
46
See, e.g., FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Nat’l Black Media
Coal. v. F.C.C., 760 F.2d 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Nat’l
Coal. to Ban Handguns v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 715 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
47
Scalia, supra note 21, at 23.
45
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don’t care,” Scalia quoted Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes approvingly,
“what [the legislature’s] intention was. I only want to know what the words
mean.”48 As described by one of the most eminent academic supporters of
the conservatives’ textualism, John Manning of Harvard Law School, just
as Justice Scalia has been its oracle, its “most vocal and . . . ablest”
opponent has been Justice Stevens.49 Before retiring in 2010, Justice
Stevens consistently defended the established mid-twentieth-century
consensus that Justice Scalia and his allies specifically set out to sideline:
“[T]he idea that legislation is a purposive act, and that judges should
interpret acts of Congress to implement the legislative purpose, . . . that the
federal courts in our system must discern and apply Congress’s intended
meaning as accurately as possible.”50
Although completely unknown outside of a discrete circle of expert
academics and judges, the Rehnquist–Roberts concept of statutory
textualism is the subject of a massive body of scholarly exposition and
criticism.51 No value will be added by my attempting to replough this
ground with a summary of the content, criticisms, defenses, and
modifications of the “textualist” approach that Justice Scalia propounded
and has, over the course of the past quarter century, persuaded his
conservative colleagues often to embrace and his progressive colleagues of
necessity to respect.52 Three observations seem appropriate here: that, in
conceptual terms, conservative textualists misleadingly frame the debate;
that the paradigm cases they marshal as typical—and academics on all sides
seem to accept—are in fact highly atypical and skew analysis; and that the
conservatives’ version of textualism transparently advances a substantive
ideological agenda.
48

Id. at 22–23 (internal quotation mark omitted).
John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2009, 2009 (2006).
50
Id. Examples of Justice Stevens’s typical statements to this effect can be found in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), where he says that “the meaning of a word must be ascertained
in the context of achieving particular objectives,” and in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532
(2007), where he notes that “[t]he broad language of § 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer
the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.”
51
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
231–45 (2d ed. 2006); Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913,
1916–26 (2006) (describing the approach of textualism); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The
Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme
Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 281 (1990) (“[T]here now exists a fully articulated and quite aggressive
assault in the Supreme Court on the use of legislative history in construing statutes. The movement’s
spiritual leader is Justice Scalia, but others, in particular Justice Kennedy, have taken up the torch.”
(footnote omitted)).
52
Manning, supra note 49, at 2009, 2010, 2026 (“In matters of statutory interpretation, the story of
the Rehnquist Court was, if anything, one of movement toward textualism—a philosophy that gives
precedence to a statute’s semantic meaning, when clear, and eschews reliance on legislative history or
other indicia of background purpose to vary the conventional meaning of the text.”).
49
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1.

Conservative Textualists’ Misleading Frame of the Enterprise of
Statutory Interpretation.—First, Justice Scalia, Professor Manning,
Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, and other “textualism”
enthusiasts misleadingly frame the comparison between their credo and the
alternative backed by Justice Stevens and his allies—interpreting text in
light of reliable indicia of statutory purpose. Conservative textualists’
constant refrain is that statutory text must govern when the text is “clear.”53
Thus, when the text is clear, statements in the legislative history cannot
contradict it. Indeed, when the meaning of the statutory text is clear,
legislative history cannot be consulted at all.54 Nor can the text of a
provision—again, where the meaning is clear—be subordinated to some
vague or overarching purpose.55 The problem with this framing of the issue
is that, in the real world, it is almost always completely beside the point. In
the overwhelming majority of cases that come before the courts—certainly
the Supreme Court—very few statutory provisions are clear. Certainly,
precious few contested statutory provisions present verbiage so clear that
there can be no serious dispute about their meaning in relation or as applied
to the circumstances of the case at hand. Nor is it true, as conservative
textualists’ formulations assume, that statutory words are frequently,
starkly, or clearly in conflict with the “purposes” that their progressive
adversaries dredge up from extrinsic sources, in particular the legislative
history. Though such situations do, of course, sometimes occur, they are
anything but the norm.56 Obviously, indisputable clarity is especially—
almost by definition—missing in cases raising questions serious enough to
merit review by the Supreme Court.
In the normal case, statutory provisions at issue are ambiguous. Hence,
interpretation literally cannot be executed without reference to some
extrinsic source or sources. Plainly, as a matter of common sense, the first
such set of extrinsic sources to examine must be the legislative history.
Where authentic and pertinent statutory purposes can be identified (as is
often, though not always, the case), how could that not be an appropriate
factor to weigh, probably heavily, perhaps, if appropriate, in conjunction
53

Id. at 2027–28.
See id.
55
See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)
(Scalia, J., majority opinion) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.” (quoting Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Where the language of a statute is clear in its application,
the normal rule is that we are bound by it.”); Miranda McGowan, Do As I Do, Not As I Say: An
Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78
MISS. L.J. 129, 131 (2008) (“Justice Scalia exhorts judges who interpret statutes to forget about what
Congress or some members of Congress might have intended.”).
56
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241–44 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54
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with other pertinent factors? Obviously, such analysis has to be conducted
thoughtfully. But courts cannot responsibly shirk that responsibility
altogether. As prominent Republican Senate Judiciary Committee member
and sometime Chairman Orrin Hatch rebuffed the early stirrings of the
textualist campaign:
It is undeniable that . . . attorneys and judges can manipulate the interpretive
process by carefully selecting and endowing with undue weight some
statements uttered in the course of the lawmaking process. Legislative history
is generally accompanied, however, by clear indicia of its legitimate role in the
legislative process and of the weight it ought to carry in illuminating the words
of the law. A careful student of the lawmaking process should have little
difficulty in establishing the weight or weightlessness of the forms of
legislative history.57

Consideration of historical sources indicative of the purpose and
understanding of textual provisions when their meaning is not self-evident
from the text is a necessity, not an option. It is common to interpretation of
all forms of legal documents—from contracts to the Constitution.58
In real-world cases in which Justice Scalia and his allies insist on
analysis of statutory provisions in isolation and exclude relevant materials
from legislative history or indications of pertinent statutory purpose, it is
not because the provisions are unambiguously clear, nor because their
meanings clearly conflict with identifiable and plausible statutory purpose
or purposes. On the contrary, in the great majority of cases in which the
challenge is to choose among plausible alternative interpretations of
nondefinitive statutory words, such as those described immediately below,
the practical effect of the rigidities of contemporary conservatives’
textualist doctrine is to deny judges the most commonsense options for
resolving ambiguities—thoughtful analysis of reliable indicia of purpose
and legislative history materials generally.
2.

Atypical Paradigm Cases Distort the “Textualism”
Debate.—A second observation I would suggest is that discussions
of the pros and cons of conservative textualism have often been thrown
askew because they are typically grounded in reference to a handful of
specific decided cases, which are themselves highly atypical and
57

Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 43, 43–44 (1988) (emphasis added). Senator Hatch, a prominent conservative active in forging
compromises that led to enactment of such legislation targeted by Rehnquist and Roberts Court
conservatives as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Violence Against Women Act, sets out a
practical, sensible list of factors which add to, or subtract from, the reliability and usefulness of
particular pieces of the legislative history of statutory provisions under review. Id. at 48–49.
58
Indeed, Justice Scalia acknowledges that statutes and the Constitution are each a legal text, which
must be interpreted in accord with “what it says or what it was understood to mean;” nevertheless, he
refuses to consider the most obvious and pertinent source—legislative history—for determining what a
statute “was understood to mean.” Scalia, supra note 21, at 46.
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inappropriate models for realistic analysis. These cases present
circumstances where a literal reading of a particular provision plausibly
yields a result in conflict with an authentic statutory purpose. Much of the
academic treatment of these issues likewise focuses on this same set of
cases.59 But in practical fact, these are odd ducks, situations in which the
literal meaning of the drafters’ language is clear, but that would, in
circumstances they failed to anticipate, defeat their purposes or yield
otherwise illogical results. Such cases make easy targets for Justice Scalia
and his allies. No doubt they also constitute easy examples for spurring
lively law school class discussions. But in the real world, they are hard
cases, and the lessons that textualist advocates purport to draw from them
make bad law. Far more typical are cases that involve unclear text and clear
statutory purpose, in which one alternative interpretation meshes closely
with that purpose and another alternative or alternatives would ignore or
defeat it. These are the kinds of cases spotlighted in Senator Leahy’s
hearings.60 They are the kinds of cases that blinkered “textualist” analysis
gets exactly wrong.
Of the cases examined in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, an
especially apt example of contemporary conservative textualism in action is
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.61 This Supreme Court decision,
which achieved widespread notoriety when it was handed down on May 31,
2007, turned on interpretation of the statute of limitations provision in the
employment discrimination title (Title VII) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.62
The provision requires workers to file suit within 180 days “after the
59

The leading paradigm case is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
There the Court considered a 1885 statute barring paying for transit to the United States of any “alien”
intending to “perform labor or service of any kind.” Id. at 458 (quoting Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23
Stat. 332 (repealed 1952)). The Court unanimously held the ban inapplicable to a church’s recruitment
of a minister from abroad on the theory that Congress’s purpose was to protect American laborers, not to
restrict immigration of ministers. Id. at 472. The Court noted: “It is the duty of the courts, under [these]
circumstances, to say that, however broad the language of the statute may be, the act, although within
the letter, is not within the intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.” Id.
The opinion recited a principle of statutory construction that today’s “conservatives” have left far
behind: “All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their
application as not to lead to injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be
presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this
character.” Id. at 461 (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486 (1868) (internal
quotation mark omitted)). A second case is United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979), in which the Court held that a company’s affirmative action program aimed at increasing job
opportunities for minority workers was not covered by the prohibition in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 on discrimination on account of “race.” Id. at 197; see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989) (holding that the American Bar Association was not a committee
“utilized” by the President, though the President frequently consulted with it).
60
See Short-Change for Consumers, supra note 9, at 1–3.
61
550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)).
62
Id. at 621.
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alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”63 In this case, when the
plaintiff retired, she was tipped off (by a coworker) that, throughout her
twenty-year career, she had received lower pay than her male counterparts
performing identical work.64 The Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict in
favor of Ledbetter, holding it to be time-barred.65 Ledbetter had contended
that her most recent paycheck was the “unlawful employment practice”
from which the 180-day limitations period should run.66 But the majority
held that the initial discriminatory decision was the last discriminatory
practice within the meaning of the provision.67 As Justice Ginsburg noted in
the dissent she read with passion from the bench, the majority’s reading
rendered the substantive equal pay opportunity guarantee of Title VII
unenforceable by and useless to many, perhaps most, of the discrimination
victims the law was enacted to protect.68 Like Ledbetter, Justice Ginsburg
elaborated, employees typically learn of pay discrimination only by
happenstance and long after the decisions that triggered their persistent
mistreatment.69
Ledbetter, which was overridden by Congress in January 2009 with the
first bill signed into law by the newly inaugurated President Barack
Obama,70 illustrates the bizarre outcomes made possible by textualists’
insistence that individual statutory provisions be read in isolation, without
reference to their purpose. But the Title VII statute of limitations provision
was manifestly not one where the meaning was clear and the indicia of
purpose attenuated. Quite the contrary, the pertinent phrase from the
provision—“unlawful employment practice”—is itself opaque in regard to
the issue before the Court.71 In contrast, the purpose of the employment
discrimination title of the Civil Rights Act could hardly be clearer.
Especially, as Justice Ginsburg explained in her dissent, in light of “the
real-world characteristics of pay discrimination” that Title VII was designed
to remedy.72
A second appropriate paradigm case—actually, line of cases—
reviewed in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings involved the remedial
provisions of the 1974 Employee Retirement and Income Security Act

63

42 U.S.C. § 2005e-5(e)(1) (2006).
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621–22.
65
Id. at 627.
66
Id. at 624.
67
Id. at 621.
68
Id. at 659–61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69
Id. at 650.
70
See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)); Obama Signs Lilly Ledbetter Act, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2009, 10:27 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/01/29/obama_signs_lilly_ledbetter_ac.html.
71
42 U.S.C. § 2005e-5(e)(1) (2006).
72
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 655.
64
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(ERISA).73 ERISA was enacted after years of investigation and debate by
Congress and the Departments of Labor, Justice, and Treasury, in addition
to Presidential commissions.74 Its purpose was to ensure sound
administration of employee retirement and health insurance plans funded
with income-tax-deductible employer contributions.75 To ensure that
employees and their families actually receive health and similar benefits as
required, Congress specified certain remedies and procedures available to
beneficiaries in the event that plan administrators failed to meet their
obligations.76 As experts like Yale Law School Professor John Langbein
have documented, Congress’s strategy for securing health care access for
American workers was to carry over and “subject these [employersponsored health] plans to the pre-existing [state law based] regime of trust
law rather than to invent a new regulatory structure.”77 By making plan
administrators fiduciaries, Congress imposed on them the traditional duties
of loyalty and prudence and provided beneficiaries with traditional
remedies for fiduciary violations, including the right of beneficiaries to be
“made whole”—to receive whatever is necessary to restore the state in
which he or she would have been but for a plan’s default. But, in three cases
decided in 1985, 1993, and 2002, Supreme Court majorities held that
ERISA, instead of nationalizing and strengthening trust protections for plan
beneficiaries, created radically more limited specific remedies in lieu of, but
not supplementary to, state trust law remedies.78 A specific catchall
provision in the Act, authorizing courts to award injunctive or “other
appropriate equitable relief,” was construed to mean only certain
prospective, injunctive relief—not monetary compensation—even though
equitable relief had long included restitution.79
This narrowing interpretation grievously misread Congress’s intent; in
dissent from the first of the two decisions in which Justice Scalia articulated
his analysis, Justice Byron White called the conservatives’ approach an
“anomaly” for “construing ERISA in a way that ‘would afford less
73

29 U.S.C § 1001 (2006).
See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error
in Russel, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1321–22 (2003). Professor Langbein’s
article details the history and purposes of ERISA summarized here.
75
§ 1001b (2006).
76
See id.
77
Langbein, supra note 74, at 1319.
78
See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220–21 (2002); Mertens
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261–63 (1993); Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
138 (1985).
79
Langbein, supra note 74, at 1348-54 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s
interpretation of the statute has been sharply criticized. Id. at 1337–38 (“[M]oney damages were and are
as much an equitable remedy as a legal remedy. Justice Scalia was . . . flatly wrong to assert that money
damages are not equally characteristic of equity when it enforces equity-based causes of action such as
those arising from breach of trust.”).
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protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before
ERISA was enacted.’”80 A decade later, after Justice Scalia and his
conservative colleagues reaffirmed his anomalous interpretation, Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer noted “the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress
and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA
regime.”81 Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinions for 5–4 majorities in the
1993 and 2002 cases, conceded that his interpretation of ERISA’s remedial
provisions—which required courts to decide whether a given form of relief
would have been available a century or more ago when courts were divided
into courts of law and courts of equity—was “unlikely” in light of the oftrepeated goals of the sponsors of the legislation.82 But this was irrelevant:
“[V]ague notions of a statute’s ‘basic purpose,’” Justice Scalia charged,
“are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its text”83—as if his
cramped reading were the only one possible.
3.

Conservative
Textualists’
Not-So-Hidden
Ideological
Agenda.—Finally, a third brief observation: the disconnect
between conservatives’ phobia for considering statutory purpose and
drafting history, and their reverence for constitutional original meaning and
contemporaneous evidence thereof, underscores both the logical flimsiness
and the ideological inspiration behind their statutory “textualism.” The fact
is, conservatives have it exactly right when they insist that, in interpreting
open-textured constitutional provisions, statements of the Framers and their
contemporaries are important, if not exclusive, sources. Increasingly,
progressives acknowledge that there is a good deal of sense in that view, so
long as it is acknowledged that contemporaneous perspectives need not
necessarily be exclusive sources.84 But the same commonsense algorithm
applies to the interpretation of statutes.
“Why,” Professor Dworkin coyly asks in his Comment on Justice
Scalia’s lead Essay in A Matter of Interpretation, “does the resolute textreader, dictionary-minder, expectation-scorner of the beginning of these
80

Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114
(1989)).
81
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The judicial critics included appointees of Republican
as well as Democratic presidents. See, e.g., Difelice, 346 F.3d at 453 (“ERISA has evolved into a shield
that insulates HMOs from liability for even the most egregious acts of dereliction committed against
plan beneficiaries, a state of affairs that I view as directly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). Judge
Becker was nominated to the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by President Nixon
and to the Third Circuit by President Reagan. Stephen Labaton, President’s Judicial Appointments:
Diverse, but Well in the Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A15.
82
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–57.
83
Id. at 261.
84
Progressive academics, for their part, have largely accepted the importance of text and history in
constitutional interpretation, as widely noted. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 9, at 1210–13.
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lectures [the thirty-four pages devoted to expounding statutory textualism]
change his mind when he comes to the most fundamental American statute
of them all [the final ten pages devoted to expounding constitutional
originalism]?”85 It is hard to resist the commonsense answer: many of the
statutes currently before the federal courts were enacted by progressive
majorities to serve progressive purposes. Hence, it is not difficult to
imagine why judges unsympathetic to such majorities and purposes would
prefer interpretive approaches that divorce statutory terms from the contexts
of their enactments. Indeed, Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, the
most eminent judicial exponent of contemporary conservative textualism
(other than Justice Scalia), makes this result-oriented ideological agenda
disarmingly explicit. Without a trace of irony, Judge Easterbrook anchors
his case for ignoring statutory purpose and legislative intent by advancing
as his premise a familiar though unsubstantiated libertarian construct of the
original purpose and intent of the Framers of the Constitution. Defending
the textualist maxim that, when statutory provisions do not specifically
address a given situation, judges should declare the law inapplicable and
dismiss the case, Judge Easterbrook explains:
Those who wrote and approved the Constitution thought that most social
relations would be governed by private agreements, customs, and
understandings, not resolved in the halls of government. . . . A rule declaring
statutes inapplicable unless they plainly resolve or delegate the solution of the
matter respects this position.86

In effect, Judge Easterbrook’s default rule is an extension of Georgetown
University libertarian Randy Barnett’s recommendation that, instead of a
presumption of constitutionality, judges should apply a “presumption of
liberty” when considering constitutional challenges to statutes.87
But, however congruent with conservative judges’ ideological
leanings, punting in the name of “textualism” flouts the job description they
were hired to discharge. As Senator Hatch noted, Congress cannot be
expected to have “anticipated every detail of every issue that might arise
under a particular statute.”88 But that is not an excuse for judges to throw up
their hands, leave parties in the lurch, and tell legislators to take as long as
necessary to try again. “It is,” Hatch explains, “the role of the Judiciary to
discern the standard promulgated by law, and apply it to specific
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Dworkin, supra note 21, at 126.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 549–50 (1983). Judge
Easterbrook’s attribution to the framers of contemporary libertarians’ constitutional vision is asserted
but unsubstantiated.
87
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
259–68 (2004).
88
Hatch, supra note 57, at 49.
86
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cases . . . . [C]areful use of reliable legislative history can often supply the
context that enlightens the text of the law.”89
Even in principle, contemporary conservatives’ refusal to acknowledge
the context of enacted laws amounts to an abdication of the judicial role. In
practice, it has increasingly become a vehicle for partisan and ideological
abuse of judicial power. A more precise, if less snappy, label might be “no
context textualism,” “out of contextualism,” or something of the sort.
III. “UNABASHED JUDICIAL LAWMAKING”: EX CATHEDRA CANONS, CLEAR
STATEMENT RULES, PRESUMPTIONS, “POSTULATES,” AND JUDICIAL
POLICIES THAT EXPRESSLY CONTRAVENE STATUTORY TEXT AND
INTENDED MEANING
The concept of textualism deployed by the conservative bloc on the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts has enabled them to purport conscientiously
to implement democratically enacted laws, while in fact defeating the
purposes and understandings that drove their enactments. A second set of
interpretive doctrines require no gestures or ritual protestations of deference
to legislators or voters. They constitute, as Justice Stevens wrote in 2009, an
“unabashed display of judicial lawmaking.”90 With these “trump Congress”
rules, the Court has expressly empowered itself to ignore and counter both
the legislative purpose (or intent) and the statutory text itself. As with
textualism, these doctrines have been extensively debated by academic and
judicial experts.91 Here I will briefly note and comment on four of the most
significant of these devices for expressly substituting judicial policy
priorities for statutory provisions: “super-strong” clear statement rules,
avoidance of constitutional questions by narrowly construing statutes,
obstruction of individual court enforcement of federal statutory rights, and
the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism” campaign.
A. Super-Strong Clear Statement Rules
Perhaps the most blatant—and most arbitrarily deployed—of the
conservatives’ trump Congress devices is the set of doctrines that
Professors Eskridge and Frickey labeled two decades ago as super-strong
clear statement rules.92 Conservatives on the Court have wielded such rules,
89

Id. The classic scholarly treatment of Senator Hatch’s point is by Justice Breyer before his
elevation to the Supreme Court. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992).
90
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91
Leading analyses of the conservatives’ expressly countermajoritarian interpretive techniques
include: the indispensable treatise by ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
13; John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WISC.
L. REV. 771; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983).
92
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 611.
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Eskridge and Frickey noted, as if they were “quasi-constitutional”
commands and used them “to confine Congress’s power in areas in which
Congress has the constitutional power to do virtually anything.”93 They
further observed that the Court’s clear statement rules for promoting
“federalism
and
other
structural
values . . . are
almost
as
countermajoritarian as now discredited Lochner-style judicial review.”94
As noted above, these devices are precisely the opposite of traditional
“clear statement” rules; the latter require courts to apply a rebuttable
presumption that Congress did not intend an interpretation of a statutory
provision that would transgress some well-established norm or convention
in the absence of a clear Congressional statement endorsing such an
interpretation.95 In practice, super-strong versions are Orwellian devices that
conservative majorities invoke to contravene and trump the meaning of
statutory terms, even when that meaning and Congress’s purpose in
enacting them is in fact clear.
The paradigm case is a 1992 decision, United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc.96 Nordic Village held that Congress had not, as required by the
applicable clear statement rule, “unequivocally” waived the federal
government’s sovereign immunity under the federal Bankruptcy Code with
regard to the recovery from the government of funds embezzled from a
bankrupt corporation and used to pay off the embezzler’s federal tax
liability.97 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and Justice Stevens wrote a
blistering dissent.98 The waiver provision at issue was, as Justice Stevens
observed, about as “straightforward” and clear as human drafters could
manage;99 it provided that, except in cases involving offsets or counterclaims—not present in the instant situation—any provision of the applicable
title of the Bankruptcy Code that “contains [the words] ‘creditor’, ‘entity’,
or ‘governmental unit’ applies to governmental units,” and, further, that any
judicial determination of an issue arising under such a provision “binds
governmental units.”100 A separate provision of the Code defines the term
“governmental unit” to include “the United States” and any instrumentality
thereof.101 As Justice Stevens noted, this literal statutory text
“unquestionably forecloses the defense of sovereign immunity.”102 In
addition, he continued, “[t]he legislative history unambiguously
93

Id. at 597.
Id. at 598.
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See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
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503 U.S. 30 (1992).
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Id. at 33–37.
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Id. at 31.
99
Id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100
11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
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Id. § 101(27) (Supp. II).
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Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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demonstrates that Congress intended the [unambiguous] statute to be read
literally.”103
Despite Congress’s multiple assertions in the statute’s text and history
that the waiver of sovereign immunity applies to the federal government in
precisely the type of disputes at issue in the case, Justice Scalia found these
clear statements not clear enough. This was so, he reasoned, because the
relevant waiver provisions were “susceptible” to two alternative
interpretations other than the literal reading, which, though “assuredly not
the only readings,” were nevertheless “plausible”; hence, the waiver was
not unambiguous and “therefore should not be adopted.”104 And as for the
legislative history’s confirmation that Congress intended the literal reading,
“legislative history has no bearing on the ambiguity point”—even if the
legislative history confirms a literal reading of a statutory provision.105
Two decades later, the Court’s conservative bloc continues to validate
the above critiques from Justice Stevens and his allies on the bench and in
the academy—and with increasingly disarming candor, as illustrated by
Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court in one of the final decisions of the
2005 term, Arlington Central School District Board of Education v.
Murphy.106 In that case, the Court held that, under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a parent prevailing in an action against a
school board was not entitled to reimbursement for consultant’s services as
part of the attorneys’ fee award mandated by the Act.107 Justice Alito
reached this judgment in the teeth of a statement in the Conference Report
meshing the House and Senate bills into the final legislation: “The
conferees intend[ed] that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’
include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses . . . .”108 This
statement did not matter, he explained, because IDEA is a “Spending
Clause” statute, providing funds to states in exchange for state compliance
with specified conditions. Pursuant to the Court’s clear statement
jurisprudence, he said, “In a Spending Clause case, the key is not what a
majority of the Members of both Houses intend but what the States are
clearly told [in the statutory text] regarding the conditions that go along
with the acceptance of those funds.”109 Justice Alito belittled the instruction
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Id. Floor statements of the sponsors of the waiver provision specifically affirmed that it
permitted bankruptcy trustees to recover “preferential transfers”—the type of prohibited transaction
involved in the case. 124 CONG. REC. 32,394 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards); id. at 33,993
(statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini).
104
Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 34, 37.
105
Id. at 37.
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548 U.S. 291 (2006).
107
Id. at 303–04.
108
Id. at 304 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.)).
109
Id. (emphasis added).
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to award expert consultants’ fees as merely a snippet of “legislative
history.”110
His dismissive characterization overlooked the fact that the statement
was not a mere individual member’s floor statement, nor even a committee
report. It was in the final report of the House–Senate conference, signed by
all conferees representing both houses and comprising both their final text
and their explanatory statement.111 Anyone knowledgeable about the
legislative process would know that such conference report explanatory
statements are likely to be reliable, considered, and precise guides to the
intended and appropriate meaning of imprecise statutory text.112
The conservatives’ message is simple enough: No statement by
Congress, in legislative history, or even in statutory text, can be assured of
turning out to be sufficiently “clear” when the law runs up against some
policy or principle especially favored by the Court’s current majority—as in
what Justice Stevens lampooned as “the Court’s love affair with the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.”113
B. Avoiding Constitutional Questions by Narrowly Construing Statutes
Another interpretative “canon” that expressly sanctions overriding
statutory text and congressional intent is the maxim that statutes should be
narrowly construed to avoid raising a “serious” constitutional question
about their validity. On its face, this doctrine appears to promote deference
to legislatures and democratic lawmaking, and no doubt it was so intended
and, presumably, is often so applied. But in practice this canon has been
abused by judges to substantially rewrite statutes without bothering to
critically analyze the content of the supposedly serious constitutional
question at stake. Harvard Professor Adrian Vermeule has noted that often,
courts have done just that, “only later to hold, when forced to confront the
question under a different statute, that the constitutional claim should not
prevail.”114
Recently, Professor Vermeule’s observation was graphically validated
in an important 2005 decision on the scope of federal authority under the
110

See id.
See id. at 311–13 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112
This analysis follows my 2006 article, Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.? Did the Roberts
Hearings Junk the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2006). Not
coincidentally, no member of the current conservative bloc has any congressional or other legislative
experience. Former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a centrist who sometimes voted with the
conservatives on the Rehnquist Court, had, before her nomination to the Court by President Reagan,
served as Majority Leader of the Arizona State Senate.
113
United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 42 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114
Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1960 (1997). This same phrase is
also quoted in ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 364, who criticize the “avoidance” canon for
encouraging judges to “do a slipshod job of constitutional analysis, failing to think through the
constitutional issues because, after all [they are] supposedly avoiding them.” Id. at 363.
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Clean Water Act (CWA) to regulate wetlands, Rapanos v. United States.115
In Rapanos, four Justices—conservatives Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito (Justice Kennedy concurred, but with a different, more moderate
rationale)—signed a plurality opinion that would have overridden three
decades of interpretation of the CWA by the responsible agencies, the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers, under
five presidents, three of them Republicans, without objection by Congress.
Under the established interpretation, the CWA authorized federal regulation
of intermittent streams and wetlands.116 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion
would have limited the CWA to waters with a permanent flow into
navigable bodies of water, thereby eliminating federal protection of vast
amounts of wetlands.117 Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion, asserted, with
scant explanation, that this narrow reading was necessary to avoid deciding
whether the CWA exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.118 He
derided the long-term bipartisan endorsement of robust wetlands protection,
not as a reason for Chevron deference, but as “entrenched executive
error.”119 And he bared both his disdain for Congress and the ideological
wellspring for that scorn, shrugging off Congress’s failure to overturn the
Corps’ interpretation, as perhaps due “simply to their unwillingness to
confront the environmental lobby.”120 This pell-mell rush by Justice Scalia
and his co-signatories to read vigorous wetlands protection out of the CWA
drew little public or media attention—far less, one imagines, than would
have been the case had they not couched their argument in “mere” statutory
terms and instead held the Act unconstitutional and beyond Congress’s
power to enact.
C. Obstructing Individual Court Enforcement of Federal Statutory Rights
A third doctrine, or set of doctrines, that Rehnquist–Roberts Court
conservative Justices have invented to override congressional intent and
weaken the impact of progressive statues is the implementation of a strong,
115

547 U.S. 715 (2006).
See id. at 719, 722.
117
Id. at 732–36.
118
Id. at 738.
119
Id. at 752. A mainstay of administrative law jurisprudence is the rule established by Justice
Stevens’s landmark opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), that “[I]f [a] statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer [i.e., interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.
The rule is applied so routinely that it is often referred to as “Chevron deference” or the “Chevron twostep” after the two-step formula Justice Stevens applied in his opinion. See, e.g., United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001) (“We granted certiorari . . . in order to consider the limits of Chevron
deference owed to administrative practice in applying a statute.”); TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41260, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS: THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 1
(2010).
120
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 750.
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often a super-strong, policy against permitting private individuals to enforce
federal statutory rights in court. This judge-made policy pops up
ubiquitously as the driving force behind an expanding family of rules. In
cases where individuals allege that state governments have violated federal
statutory rights, the conservatives’ theories for barring court access claim
parentage in a states’ rights oriented conception of “federalism,” discussed
briefly below.121 In an important subset of such cases, suits to enforce rights
under “Spending Clause” statutes such as Medicaid and housing statutes,
members of the conservative bloc have created theories that render rights
prescribed as conditions attached to federal grants as less robust and less
susceptible to court enforcement than rights under other types of federal
laws.122
While most safety-net statutes do not have express private rights of
action, the Court held in 1980 in Maine v. Thiboutot that such statutes can
be enforced by low-income individuals against states utilizing the cause of
action in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which expressly permits the enforcement of
“laws.”123 Section 1983 was originally enacted in the Klu Klux Klan Act of
1871.124 The conservative minority dissented in Thiboutot, protesting
against reading the word “laws” to mean “all statutes,” for the explicit
policy reason that low-income individuals should not be permitted to
“harass state and local officials” and “overburden[] courts” with claims that
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See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287–91 (2002) (holding that nondisclosure
requirements of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act were not privately enforceable rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 23 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing
that not all federal statutory rights should be privately enforceable partly because “[n]o one can predict
the extent to which litigation arising from today’s decision will harass state and local officials”).
122
The effectively super-strong clear statement rule applied by Justice Alito in Arlington Central
School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006), severely obstructs private suits as a
practical matter but does not entirely rule them out in principle. An even stricter bar to suits to enforce
“spending clause” statutory rights has been endorsed by Justices Scalia and Thomas, but has not to date
been accepted by any other members of the conservative bloc. That, however, could change with the
Court’s decision in the first case to be argued in its 2011–2012 Term, Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent
Living Center, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 992 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 09958). See Simon Lazarus, Acting Solicitor General to Supremes: Close Courthouse Doors to Safety Net
Beneficiaries, ACS BLOG (June 9, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/acting-solicitor-general-tosupremes-close-courthouse-doors-to-safety-net-beneficiaries. Professor Samuel Bagenstos has noted
that, while “Arlington Central may seem like a narrow case, . . . the ‘clear notice’ principle it adopts
could have far-reaching consequences for the enforcement of such important federal laws as the statutes
that set up the Medicare and Medicaid programs.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in
the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 351 (2008).
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448 U.S. at 4.
124
Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
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states violated federal law.125 After conservative Justices garnered a
majority of the Court, they greatly weakened the effectiveness of § 1983.126
In 2002, the Court held in Gonzaga University v. Doe that, even though
§ 1983 expressly provides for individual suits to redress state violations of
federally prescribed rights, nevertheless suits based on that provision must
be rejected unless they meet difficult criteria the Court had previously
imposed on suits based on an “implied” private right of action.127 Implied
rights of action arose from court decisions interpreting particular laws to
authorize private enforcement suits despite the absence of express
authorization. The Court had never before equated any other express right
of action with increasingly disfavored and discouraged implied rights of
action. It gave no justification in Gonzaga for why a cause of action passed
in the wake of the eradication of American slavery should be treated
differently than every other express cause of action. The decision was
clearly a fulfillment of the policy objective expressed in the Thiboutot
dissent of keeping low-income individuals from having their day in court to
enforce federal law.128
Justice Stevens parted company from other liberal Justices who joined
in the result in Gonzaga. Justices Breyer and Souter concurred in the
judgment but disagreed with the majority’s rule limiting court access under
§ 1983 on substantially the same very restricted basis applicable in implied
right of action cases129—so that restrictive rule drew support exclusively
from the familiar five-member conservative majority. Justice Stevens
vehemently dissented from the Court’s diminution of rights of
disadvantaged individuals, recognizing the significant damage from the
Court’s treatment of statutory rights.130 Barely a year after Justice Stevens’s
retirement, progressive advocates have noted that something of his razorsharp grasp of the critical importance of private judicial enforcement has
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Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 23 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and then-Associate Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 11.
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See Rochelle Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption: Alternative Means of Court Access for
Safety Net Statutes, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 27, 41–45 (2008).
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536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
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See Bobroff, supra note 126, at 57–59.
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Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 291–92 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens’s dissent
was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer supported the result on the ground that the individual statute which the plaintiff in Gonzaga
sought to enforce, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) did not manifest
Congressional intent to confer a private judicial remedy. Id. at 291 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Breyer based this interpretation partly on the ground that the vague wording of
FERPA had led to legal challenges to myriad routine practices in schools, including peer grading, honor
society recommendations, and public bad conduct marks. Id. at 291–92. Justice Stevens concluded that
FERPA did manifest intent to confer a private a private remedy. Id. at 293–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130
Id. at 302.
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been missing from opinions of his former colleagues among the progressive
Justices.131
In cases where individuals seek to vindicate federal statutory rights
against corporations or other nongovernment defendants, the conservative
Justices have cited the presumption against private suits—buttressed,
sometimes, with references to federalism—as a basis for imposing cramped
interpretations of statutory provisions that undermine the capacity of the
law to achieve its purposes. In the most far-reaching of these latter cases to
date, the 2008 decision Stoneridge Investment Partners v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the five-Justice
conservative bloc, held that pension funds and other group and individual
investors in companies decimated by fraudulent managers, such as Enron,
cannot recoup their losses from third parties who knowingly facilitated the
fraud.132 Typically such collaborators—contractors, vendors, consultants—
are the only culprits left with assets from which compensation is possible.133
Effectively, the conservative bloc left hundreds of thousands of innocent
shareholders holding the bag for the deliberate fraud perpetrated by
unscrupulous corporations, like Enron, and their knowing collaborators.134
Justice Kennedy made clear that the impetus for this anomalous result was
his colleagues’ hostility to the private right of action that the Supreme Court
has for decades held Congress to have impliedly intended for § 10b.135
Congress and small investors have long relied on the existence of this
remedy for securities fraud.136 “Though it remains the law,” Justice
Kennedy concluded, “the § 10(b) private right should not be extended
beyond its present boundaries.”137 Justice Kennedy simply ignored the
common sense alternative view that liability for co-conspirators in a sham
131

See Rochelle Bobroff, Liberal Justices Miss the Point in Recent Court Access Cases, ACS BLOG
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06-43).
134
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Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 448, 455 (2009); Adam Reiser,
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Congress to Counteract the Troubling Consequences of StoneRidge, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 257, 261–62;
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Ivanovich, Supreme Court Ruling Could Limit Suits by Enron Investors, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 15, 2008),
http://www.chron.com/business/article/Supreme-Court-ruling-could-limit-suits-by-Enron-1786145.php.
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Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (arguing that the existence of an
implied right of action under § 10b is “beyond peradventure”).
136
Joseph A. Grundfest, Is There an Express Section 10(b) Private Right of Action? A Response to
Professor Prentice 5 (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 352 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1077437.
137
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165.
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transaction, designed solely to mislead investors, is no extension of § 10b
but simply a logical application, congruent with the statute’s well-known
purposes. His grudging acknowledgement that the § 10b private right of
action “remains the law” because Congress subsequently ratified it makes
clear that he and his colleagues would prefer it otherwise and will continue,
as in the case at hand, to emasculate it as much as possible.
The Stoneridge majority’s truncation of long-established small investor
protections provoked a noteworthy dissent from Justice Stevens. Ever the
seasoned legal craftsman and advocate, he began his opinion with an easyto-grasp, hard-to-answer three sentence summary of the relevant facts and
law:
Charter Communications, Inc., [the principal actor, acknowledged by the
majority to be liable under § 10b] inflated its revenues by $17 million in order
to cover up a $15 to $20 million expected cash flow shortfall. It could not have
done so absent the knowingly fraudulent actions of Scientific–Atlanta, Inc.,
and Motorola, Inc. Investors relied on Charter’s revenue statements in deciding
whether to invest in Charter and in doing so relied on respondents’ fraud,
which was itself a “deceptive device” prohibited by § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. This is enough to satisfy the requirements of
§ 10(b) . . . .138

Pushing on to the next level, Justice Stevens targeted the judicial
policy driving the decision, namely, “the Court’s continuing campaign to
render the private cause of action under § 10(b) toothless.”139 He powerfully
critiqued the conservatives’ hostility towards private rights of action in
general and elaborated how that hostility fundamentally conflicts with longestablished law and legal practice. Targeting Justice Scalia’s acerbic
assertion in another case that implied statutory causes of action are “merely
a ‘relic’ of our prior ‘heady days,’” Justice Stevens countered that “[t]hose
‘heady days’ persisted for two hundred years.”140 Justice Stevens went on to
show the long-established, widespread acceptance of the principle that
“every wrong shall have a remedy.”141 This principle, scorned by the
Rehnquist–Roberts conservative Justices, was, he noted, endorsed in 1801
by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, guaranteed by threequarters of state constitutions, and specifically applied to the interpretation
of federal statutes by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, following
English practice derived from the Magna Carta.142

138

Id. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 175.
140
Id. at 175–76 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
141
Id. at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142
See id. at 177–78.
139

800

106:769 (2012)

Stripping the Gears of National Government

D. “Fundamentally Inconsistent with the Framers’ Conception of the
Constitutional Order”: The Conservative Bloc’s “Federalism” Campaign
and Justice Stevens’s Response
As is apparent from this review of contemporary trump Congress
doctrines, “federalism” ubiquitously pops up as an asserted basis for
countermanding the text and purpose of federal progressive statutes.
Notably, the notion of federalism reflexively invoked by the conservative
Justices and their allies is a one-sided caricature of the actual federalist
design reflected in the Constitution and contemplated by its Framers. In
fact, that design pushes in two directions and emphasizes the economic,
national security, and liberty-securing benefits of federal power. This
textured vision was spelled out in The Federalist No. 10 and other
manifestations of the original 1789 understanding, implemented in the
iconic decisions of Chief Justice John Marshall and substantially
strengthened by the Reconstruction and Progressive Era amendments.143
After all, the Framers, authors of The Federalist, and Chief Justice Marshall
were known as “federalists,” precisely because they, and the Constitution
they had drafted and supported, radically enhanced federal authority vis-àvis the states, as compared to its predecessor Articles of Confederation.
However clear that may be from relevant constitutional provisions and
familiar indicia of their original meaning, conservatives ritualistically cite
“federalism” as a self-evident basis for limiting the reach of progressive
statutes and, especially, obstructing the ability of private individuals to
enforce them in court.144
The most aggressive instance of the conservative Justices’ antigovernment activism in the name of federalism involved an express resort
to the Constitution. In the late 1990s, a series of bitterly contested 5–4
decisions drastically circumscribed Congress’s authority to (among other
things) “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment, as expressly prescribed by
Section Five of that amendment,145 and expanded Eleventh Amendment
143

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 187–89, 194–95, 196–98 (1824) (explaining the
Constitution grants Congress a broad power to regulate “commerce which concerns more States than
one,” which “extend[s] to or affect[s] other States” and not simply commerce that crosses states’
borders); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819) (stating that “necessary” in the
Necessary and Proper Clause should be read broadly to allow Congress to act by means that are
“convenient” or “useful”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (explaining how a republic
comprised of a central government presiding over constituent states can limit the harmful effects of
partisanship).
144
See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 685–86 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
145
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this [Amendment].” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have identical enforcement provisions. Id. at amends. XIII, XV.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Court announced that legislation implementing its
authority expressly granted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would be evaluated under a
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restrictions on the ability of private individuals to sue state governments for
violating federal rights.146 These decisions acknowledged that their
expansive curtailment of state accountability contradicted the actual text of
the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits only diversity of citizenship suits
against states by citizens of “another State” or foreign countries.147 But, the
conservative majority held, the amendment “stand[s] not so much for what
it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.”148 This
“presupposition,” they claimed, constitutes a blanket bar to private suits
against states: “[I]t is inherent in the nature of [state] sovereignty, not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent . . . .”149 Thus, the
conservative bloc here simply displaced the plain meaning of constitutional
text with an asserted contemporaneous understanding directly contradicted
by that text. This should certainly qualify as an outstanding example of
chutzpah, given the same Justices’ oft-repeated celebration of strict
adherence to the actual text of the Constitution, not to mention their
adamant rejection of considering any extrinsic evidence to overcome or, in
many instances, even to interpret, statutory text.
In dissent, Justice Stevens spotlighted the vast scope and reactionary
impact of the majority’s position: The new rule would, he noted, prevent
“Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions
against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those
concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast
national economy”150—a forecast quickly validated by subsequent 5–4
rulings.151 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, he skewered their
means–ends test far stricter than the deferential “rational basis” standard long applicable for legislation
enacted pursuant to Congress’s general authority to enact laws “necessary and proper” to carry into
execution the powers enumerated in the 1789 Constitution. Id. at 520, 530–33. This innovation was
reaffirmed and interpreted in highly stringent terms in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000), and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). In Garrett,
Justice Breyer, writing for the four progressives, impugned the legitimacy of the majority’s “congruent
and proportional” test in stern terms similar to Justice Stevens’s Seminole Tribe rejection of the
majority’s countertextual expansion of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 531 U.S. at 388–89
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that Section 5 overrides federalism-based obstacles to congressional
authority, that the majority’s position serves no “constitutionally based federalism interest,” and that
“[t]he Court, through its evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its failure to distinguish
between judicial and legislative constitutional competencies, improperly invades a power that the
Constitution assigns to Congress”).
146
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
147
U.S. CONST. amend XI.
148
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779
(1991) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
149
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (internal quotation mark
omitted)).
150
Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (Americans with
Disabilities Act did not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for individual
claiming disability-motivated employment discrimination); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
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attempt to find historical justification for contravening the text of the
Constitution. Far from being a “postulate” embedded by the Framers in the
original design of the Constitution, he wrote, sovereign immunity in
eighteenth-century jurisprudence was “entirely the product of [English]
judge-made [common] law” derived from royalist and established religion
precepts.152 Such notions were anathema to the revolutionary generation, he
noted.153 And he added that Chief Justice Marshall had expressly confirmed
that the Amendment should not be read broadly to enact an amorphous
concept of protecting states’ sovereign “dignity.”154
In the years immediately following Seminole Tribe, Justice Stevens led
his progressive colleagues in taking the extraordinary step of refusing “to
accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent,”155 to underscore what they
perceived as an historic threat to eviscerate Congress’s constitutional
authority and individuals’ citizenship rights. Justice Stevens explained that
the conservatives’ open-ended doctrinal barrier to ensuring state compliance
with federal law is “so fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers’
conception of the constitutional order that it has forsaken any claim to the
usual deference or respect owed to decisions of this Court.”156 In the same
vein, he emphasized the constitutional imperative of deference to Congress
that the five-member majority had abandoned:
There is not a word in the text of the Constitution supporting the Court’s
conclusion that the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity limits
Congress’s power to authorize private parties, as well as federal agencies, to
enforce federal law against the States. The importance of respecting the
Framers’ decision to assign the business of lawmaking to the Congress dictates
firm resistance to the present majority’s repeated substitution of its own views
of federalism for those expressed in statutes enacted by the Congress and
signed by the President.157

Finally, Justice Stevens linked his textual, original-meaning, and
Framers’-intent arguments to judicial restraint and sealed them together as a
package spotlighting the conservative Justices’ radical judicial activism:
82–91 (2000) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit by faculty members of Florida State University against
the University for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
722–23, 730–31 (1999) (Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars private suits in state courts
prescribed by federal statute for enforcement of federal statutory rights—even though the Eleventh
Amendment text references only the “judicial power of the United States” U.S. CONST. amend. XXI
(emphasis added)); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 641–
48 (1999) (Eleventh Amendment renders state entity issuing tuition prepayment contacts immune from
suit by private competitor for patent infringement).
152
517 U.S. at 95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153
See id. at 95–97.
154
Id. at 96.
155
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
156
Id. at 97–98.
157
Id. at 96.
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The kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe, Alden v.
Maine, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings
Bank, and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd. represents such a radical departure from the proper role of this
Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises.158

The uncompromising stand by Justice Stevens and his progressive
colleagues quickly bore fruit. From 2003–2005, the conservative bloc
fractured in several cases that brought the “federalism revolution” to an
abrupt halt.159 In this turnabout, Justice Stevens played a decisive role,
deploying his lawyerly skill at assembling majorities and writing opinions
with broad and enduring precedential impact.160 In Tennessee v. Lane,
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court accepted the conservative bloc’s
“congruent and proportional” framework for defining Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 enforcement authority—presumably
essential to win Justice O’Connor’s vote—but then reduced the evidentiary
hurdles that Congress must meet under that framework so that they do not
obviously differ materially from traditional “rational basis” deference in
Necessary and Proper Clause precedents.161 This shift provoked Justice
Scalia, in dissent, to renounce his prior acceptance of the “congruent and
proportional” framework.162
158

Id. at 98–99 (citations omitted).
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 3–9 (2005) (6–3 decision with Justice Kennedy joining the
five progressives and Justice Scalia concurring separately, holding that the Commerce Clause authorized
application of the Controlled Substances Act to prosecute an individual for growing marijuana on her
property for her own medicinal use); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 512–15 (2004) (5–4 decision
with Justice O’Connor joining the four progressive Justices to hold that a quadriplegic could enforce the
Americans with Disabilities Act against a state government which provided no elevator access to a
courtroom in which he was being tried for an alleged crime); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 730–35 (2003) (6–3 decision, opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor
and three progressive Justices, ruling that congressional findings of systematic gender discrimination
justified applying a statutory private right of action against state governments to enforce the Family and
Medical Leave Act). Conservative commentators saw these decisions as “the end of the federalism
revolution.” Ramesh Ponnuru, The End of the Federalism Revolution, NAT’L REV., July 4, 2005, at 33.
160
Immediately after stepping down as President George W. Bush’s Solicitor General in July 2004,
Ted Olson observed that “[c]onservatives have every reason to weep,” because they “lost virtually every
important and controversial case” of the 2002–2003 and 2003–2004 Supreme Court Terms, a
progressive shutout in which “The crafty and genial hand of Justice Stevens . . . was everywhere
evident.” Theodore B. Olson, Supreme Court Roundup, October 2003 Term, Speech to the Federalist
Society, District of Columbia Chapter (July 9, 2004), in BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN
PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 227 n.15 (2010) (Barnhart and Schlickman do not provide a
citation for accessing a copy of Olson’s speech, but I was present at the luncheon where he spoke and
heard his appraisal of Justice Stevens’s role).
161
541 U.S. at 522–34.
162
Id. at 557–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In 2005 Justice Stevens delivered the coup de grâce to the
federalism revolution, writing for the Court in a 6–3 decision that reaffirmed Congress’s broad authority
to regulate interstate commerce, despite 5–4 decisions in 1995 and 2001 that seemed to erect new limits
to that source of power. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 23–33. Justice Stevens’s sweeping majority opinion
also prompted then-Judge John Roberts, during his confirmation hearings after being nominated to serve
159
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While the conservative bloc’s “federalism” campaign surfaced
expressly constitutional arguments, it nevertheless fits in with the other
purportedly nonconstitutional doctrinal initiatives considered here. On all
these fronts, to date at least, the conservative Justices have avoided frontal
challenge to the post-New Deal regime broadly defining substantive
congressional domestic authority. Instead, their strategy has been to
obstruct the exercise of that authority, especially by curtailing private
enforcement suits. Behind the glaring contradictions among these
obstructionist doctrinal initiatives, and with other supposedly fundamental
conservative jurisprudential tenets, the common feature they share is clear
enough: simple ideological hostility to the substance of the progressive
statutes they undermine. As acknowledged by American Enterprise Institute
scholar Michael S. Greve, an admirer of the Court’s “federalism”
jurisprudence, these disparate rules, whether purportedly constitutional or
interpretational, are in reality “antientitlement doctrines,” which are
“connected, such that plaintiffs who manage to evade one obstacle are
bound to stumble over another.”163
IV. FAIR-WEATHER FEDERALISM AND FAIR-WEATHER TEXTUALISM:
CONSERVATIVES’ DOCTRINAL INITIATIVES TO INVALIDATE STATE
PROGRESSIVE STATUTES
As noted above, Justice Stevens’s dissents in the late 1990s
“federalism” constitutional cases illumine how starkly his conservative
colleagues’ “sovereign immunity” jurisprudence conflicts with the most
fundamental axioms of both their originalist approach for interpreting the
Constitution and their textualist approach to interpreting statutes. They
expressly scuttle the plain meaning of the relevant legal text (the Eleventh
Amendment) and summarily shunt aside persuasive extrinsic evidence of
contemporaneous meaning.164 But this logical and philosophical
as Chief Justice, to state that the 1995 and 2001 decisions did not “junk” the Court’s prior post-1937
Commerce Clause precedents. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 271–72, 356
(2005) (statement of Justice John G. Roberts) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing].
163
Greve, supra note 18, at 3. Greve continues:
Plaintiffs who escape from restrictive statutory interpretation into section 1983 will find that route,
too, strewn with obstacles. They may find that their purported right was unrecognized in 1871. Or
they may find that their claims for monetary damages—which are often the only effective means of
forcing state and local governments into compliance—are blocked by a slew of Supreme Court
decisions granting the states sovereign immunity . . . . Let plaintiffs argue that the state has waived
its immunity by accepting federal funds, and they will lose. Let plaintiffs seek to obtain relief by
naming a state’s officers, rather than the state itself, as a defendant, and they will find that this socalled Ex Parte Young rule, once readily available, has become a rare exception.
Id. (emphasis added).
164
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Justice Souter elaborated Justice Stevens’s case in an
85-page opinion. 517 U.S. 44, 100–85 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). He exhaustively reviewed the
debates in the 1787 Philadelphia Convention, the postconvention ratification debates, Chief Justice
Marshall’s key decisions, and other contemporaneous sources. Id. at 130–64. He also noted that “plain
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incoherence reaches greater heights still with two sets of doctrinal
initiatives that the conservative bloc has aggressively promoted to
invalidate progressive state laws. These two initiatives are (1) expansive
interpretation of criteria for finding state laws “preempted” by federal laws,
pursuant to the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and (2) conversion of the
1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) into a platform for roving judicial
immunization of businesses from private judicial remedies under state (and
federal) laws protecting customers, retirees, depositors, workers, and other
individuals.
While these initiatives run counter to the conservatives’ textualism and
federalism credos, they harmonize with strategic advice offered by Justice
Scalia to members of the fledgling Federalist Society in 1982 (when he was
still Professor Scalia). Scalia reminded his audience that their underlying
goal was “market freedom,” and that, hence, they should avoid reflexive
support for states’ rights in all contexts. On the contrary, he urged,
conservatives should “fight a two-front war” against overzealous regulation
at the state no less than the federal level.165 In the intervening years, Justice
Scalia and his colleagues have been carrying out that recommendation.
Professor Ernest Young has observed that driving this two-faced regime is a
“libertarian vision” that “sees federalism as a tool of deregulation with the
potential to keep both national and state governments within relatively
narrow bounds.”166
A. Squelching State Regulatory Laws Via
Supremacy Clause-Based Preemption
Under both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Roberts, a major
preoccupation of the Court has been with suits to “preempt” state laws as
inconsistent with federal laws, which must prevail as the “supreme Law of
the Land” under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.167 As noted above,
during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure from 1986 to 2004, preemption
cases accounted for a staggering 8% of the Court’s civil docket, according
to the American Enterprise Institute.168 Most of these cases were brought by
business interests seeking to overturn state regulatory laws. Frequently,
text” should necessarily trump the allegedly implicit “background principle[s]” and “postulates” on
which the conservative majority purported to ground the new doctrinal weapon it had handed itself to
hem in Congress’s legislative authority. Id. at 125–28.
165
Simon Lazarus, Justice Scalia’s Two-Front War, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 6, 2008),
http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=justice_scalias_two_front_war (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia).
166
Young, supra note 19, at 249; accord Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the
Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462–63 (2002).
167
The clause provides that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every States shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
168
Out of 1302 civil cases decided by the Rehnquist Court over that time, 105 were preemption
cases. Greve & Klick, supra note 15, at 50, 61 n.42.
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Supreme Court majorities have granted such requests, striking down state
statutes and common law remedies in fields spanning, for example,
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, pesticides, auto safety, cigarette labeling,
predatory lending, pensions, health insurance, and many others.169 Neither
the five ordinarily conservative Justices nor the four ordinarily progressive
Justices have voted with rigid consistency on preemption issues, though in
recent years, 5–4 polarization has appeared with increasing frequency on
this as on other fronts.170
Justice Stevens, however, was consistent on preemption issues over
these matters for more than two decades. He was passionately committed to
keeping the law in line with the same first principle that animated his
statutory jurisprudence generally: deference to legislators. Over and over,
he reminded his colleagues that courts’ authority to invalidate state laws on
Supremacy Clause grounds derives entirely and exclusively from the text
and purpose of the federal statutes alleged to require such a radical invasion
of state prerogatives. Invariably, his opinions scrupulously winnowed
federal statutes and their legislative histories for meaningful indications as
to whether preemption was required to achieve statutory goals. This
principle of deference has always been the bedrock of preemption doctrine.
But often it has been observed as much in the breach as in fact. In
particular, the Court has been notably inconstant in applying the
“presumption against preemption” designed to promote congressional
169

See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011) (finding FDA requirements for
drug labeling preempted state tort law that would have imposed a stricter duty to warn users of risks);
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315, 330 (2008) (holding that FDA medical device regulations
preempt state remedies for negligent manufacture); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2007)
(holding that federal banking regulations preempt state predatory lending and other consumer protection
laws); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004) (holding that ERISA preempted state law
for remedies against health insurance provider whose wrongful denial of coverage caused serious
physical injury); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 535 U.S. 525, 570–71 (2001) (holding that federal
cigarette labeling rules preempt wrongful death claims against cigarette manufacturers); Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000) (holding that U.S. Department of Transportation
regulations preempt state tort remedies for failure to install airbags prior to D.O.T.-prescribed phase-in
date).
170
Among the conservative Justices, Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas in particular have
appeared alternatively on the “business” and “consumer” side, though for somewhat different reasons.
Among the progressives, Justice Breyer has sometimes appeared to give greater weight to promoting
uniform regulatory standards for economic efficiency reasons than to promoting state autonomy via
strict adherence to the presumption against preemption. Justice Kennedy, the least reliable member of
the conservative bloc, joined Justice Stevens’s majority opinion ruling against preemption in Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 556 (2009). Perhaps because the case featured a highly sympathetic plaintiff and
received intense publicity, Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment in Wyeth, but with a separate
concurrence reiterating his frequently expressed aversion to overbroad preemption on states’ rights
grounds. Id. at 582–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer’s separate concurrence
in Wyeth emphasized that “state tort law will sometimes interfere with the FDA’s desire to create a drug
label” with uniform nationwide application, id. at 582 (Breyer, J., concurring), a concern that has
prompted him (and other progressive Justices) to vote in favor of preemption against plaintiffs seeking
recovery under state tort provisions, such as, for example, in Reigel, 552 U.S. at 313.
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supremacy and ensure respect for state autonomy. Justice Stevens was
consistently the Court’s leading champion of retaining and giving scope to
the presumption.
Towards the middle of the Court’s 2008–2009 term, the conservative
bloc appeared set to drive from preemption doctrine even lip-service
acknowledgement of the presumption against preemption and to turn
preemption into an open-ended warrant for canceling state common law and
statutory protections in all areas touched by federal regulatory statutes. In
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court held on February 20, 2008 that
manufacturers of unsafe medical devices exempt from state tort suits on the
ground that such suits were preempted by a 1976 federal law requiring prescreening by the federal Food and Drug Administration before such devices
could be marketed.171 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia overtly scorned
state common law protections, derided the irrationality of piecemeal jury
determinations, and, in the teeth of Congress’s evident design in 1976 to
strengthen, not weaken, consumer protections from defective medical
devices, he fairly sneered that it is “not our job to speculate” on Congress’s
purpose.172 In a case raising related issues, argued five days later, WarnerLambert v. Kent, the Court deadlocked 4–4 because Chief Justice Roberts
was recused.173 But the oral argument appeared to presage further erosion of
deference to state autonomy and Congress’s statutory objectives or
directions—so much so that a website for product liability defense lawyers
speculated, only half in jest, that their line of work might soon disappear.174
However, just months later, this strong tide turned, as Justice Stevens
startled observers by assembling majorities to rebuff business litigants
seeking immunity from state law in two widely noted cases. In both cases,
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,175 and Wyeth v. Levine,176 Justice Stevens’s
opinion for the Court emphatically restored congressional purpose and the
presumption against preemption as lodestars for preemption doctrine. In
Altria, decided December 15, 2008, he began his argument asserting that
“‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every preemption case,” adding that “Congress may indicate pre-emptive intent
through a statute’s express language or through its structure and purpose.”177
In Wyeth, he elaborately reaffirmed that
[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has
“legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” . . . we
171

552 U.S. at 324–25.
Id. at 326.
173
552 U.S. 440 (2008) (4–4 decision).
174
Lazarus, supra note 165.
175
555 U.S. 70 (2008).
176
555 U.S. 555 (2009).
177
555 U.S. at 70, 76 (alteration in original) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
172
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“start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.”178

Whether Justice Stevens’s restoration of statutory text-and-purpose
discipline in administering preemption doctrine will hold remains to be
seen. In the 2010–2011 term, the Court, in one of two business–consumer
preemption cases, unanimously declined to preempt state tort law alleged
by a manufacturer-defendant to conflict with National Highway Traffic
Safety Act regulations—evidently signaling retrenchment from a 1992
decision holding that not hugely different provisions of the same regulation
preempted a similar state law.179 But in the second case, PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, a 5–4 majority ruled in favor of preemption in circumstances
quite similar to those in which, two years earlier, Justice Stevens had
mustered six votes against preemption.180 Wyeth ruled preemption
inapplicable in a case in which an original brand-name drug manufacturer,
whose warning label conformed to FDA requirements but failed to meet
state tort law reasonable care standards, could have requested FDA
permission to change the label.181 PLIVA preempted state tort law in a
similar case involving a generic drug manufacturer, distinguishing Wyeth
on the ground that statutorily prescribed procedures for requesting a label
change for generic manufacturers are more complex, hence, less certain to
succeed, than for brand-name manufacturers.182 In dissent, on behalf of
herself and the other progressive Justices, Justice Sotomayor
understandably noted that the distinction “makes no sense.”183 Justice
Thomas’s opinion for the majority prompted at least one Supreme Court
expert to conclude that it signaled “the disappearance of the historic
‘presumption against preemption,’” which Justice Stevens appeared to have
emphatically reaffirmed but two years before in Altria and Wyeth.184
B. “An Edifice of the Court’s Own Creation”: Transmutation of the
Federal Arbitration Act into a Platform for Big Business Immunity from
State and Federal Protections for Employees, Consumers, and
Other Individuals
In July 2008, Harvard Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, testifying before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, was asked what sorts of corrective
178

555 U.S. at 565 (alteration and omissions in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
179
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1134 (2011).
180
131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011).
181
555 U.S. at 559–61, 568–70.
182
131 S. Ct. at 2574.
183
Id. at 2590 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
184
Patricia Millett, From High Court to Heavyweights, Highlights of the 2010 Term, NAT’L L.J.
(June 29, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticlePrinterFriendlyNLJ.jsp?id=1202498926592.
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measures would be most effective to “fix” various erroneous narrowing
interpretations imposed by the courts on workplace antidiscrimination
laws.185 Professor Bartholet advised the senators that their top priority “fix”
should not be to amend any of the civil rights provisions that the Court had
misconstrued and weakened.186 Instead, she testified, the single most
effective measure that Congress could enact to reinvigorate employment
discrimination safeguards would be to overturn the Court’s expansive
interpretations of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).187 Under the
FAA as the Court’s conservative bloc has construed it, employers can
require all employees as a condition of employment to agree to submit all
claims, under any federal or state law, to binding mandatory arbitration
utilizing fora and arbitrators prescribed by the employment contract. For
numerous reasons, extensively catalogued and documented by courts and
scholars, such forced arbitration procedures, especially as they have been
constrained and defined in recent 5–4 Supreme Court decisions, render
unenforceable legal guarantees such as workplace discrimination
protections—or protections of any sort for individuals obliged to sign
nonnegotiable contracts imposed by businesses or other large organizations
such as consumers, patients, nursing home residents, depositors, retirees, or
investors. Thus, Professor Bartholet’s appraisal of the destructive impact of
the Court’s FAA jurisprudence on equal employment opportunity
guarantees applies with equal force to literally all types of individual legal
protections from corporate abuse, state and federal.188
The Court has derived this truly extraordinary power—to degrade or
override so vast a swath of important legislation—by torturing the text of
this near-century-old law and disregarding its legislative history. “[O]ver
the past decade,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote in a 1995 concurring
opinion, “the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining
congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building
instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”189 As soon as the Court
185

Courting Big Business: The Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions on Corporate Misconduct and
Laws Regulating Corporations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 16, 36 (2008)
(statement of Professor Elizabeth Bartholet).
186
See id. at 42.
187
Id. at 41.
188
See, e.g., Martha Nimmer, Note, The High Cost of Mandatory Arbitration, 12 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 183 (2010); JOSHUA M. FRANK, STACKED DECK: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF
FORCED ARBITRATION 1–3 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1457229. An excellent analysis that references numerous valuable scholarly, judicial, and
other sources, is David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101
(2009).
189
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). Allied-Bruce held that the FAA provision covering, with certain exceptions, all
arbitration agreements “involved in commerce” reached the full extent of Congress’s interstate
commerce power as defined post-1937, not as far more narrowly defined by Supreme Court doctrine
extant in 1925. See id. at 277–79.

810

106:769 (2012)

Stripping the Gears of National Government

launched itself on this course, Justice Stevens consistently objected to its
decisions that had “effectively rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive
scope that Congress certainly did not intend.”190 For some time, as the Court
continued its gradual expansion of the scope and impact of the FAA,
divisions were neither rigid nor ideological. In 1984, Justice O’Connor,
joined by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the majority’s
ruling that the FAA applied to state as well as federal courts, as “judicial
revisionism,” and “unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary,
and . . . inexplicable.”191 In 1995, Justice Thomas, in an elaborate opinion
joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the Court’s decision to require state
as well as federal courts to comply with the FAA, noting that the Act was
“ambiguous,” and hence should not be construed “to displace state law.”192
Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the Court. Justice O’Connor issued a
separate concurrence, supporting the result on stare decisis grounds, but
voicing her agreement with the merits of Justice Stevens’s dissents from the
Court’s earlier precedents, which stressed deference to congressional intent
and to states’ prerogatives as a basis for opposing the Court’s expansion of
the FAA.193
In 2001 the Court’s persistent campaign to broaden the FAA jelled into
the rigid, ideologically polarized shape it has displayed since then. At that
point, business advocates showed the urgent priority they attached to
converting the FAA, originally enacted simply to ensure federal court
enforcement of voluntary commercial arbitration agreements between
companies,194 into a litigation ban to be imposed on individuals with no
realistic leverage to resist. Instantly, the Court’s conservatives shed the
states’ rights, fidelity-to-text, and strict constructionist misgivings they had
190

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The decision preempted a
California law providing that wage collection actions could be maintained without regard to a private
agreement to arbitrate such disputes. Id. at 492 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens’s dissent observed
that, for more than the first half-century of the existence of the FAA, neither courts nor litigants “even
considered the possibility that the Act had pre-empted state-created rights.” Id. at 493 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
191
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 36 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
192
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 292 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas added, “we must be
‘absolutely certain’ that Congress intended such displacement before we give pre-emptive effect to a
federal statute,” id. at 292 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991)), and noted
specifically that, “[i]n 1925, the enactment of a ‘substantive’ arbitration statute along the lines
envisioned by Southland would have displaced an enormous body of state law,” id. at 292–93. In other
words, Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia acknowledged—and in this 1995 opinion, strongly regretted—
that even at that point in time, the Court’s expansion of the FAA displaced “an enormous body of state
law,” which Congress in 1925 would not have intended.
193
Id. at 282–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
194
See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the
J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16–17 (1924) (statement of Julius Cohen) (noting
that in New York, an agreement to arbitrate “was a valid agreement in certain divisions of the law, but
never followed, because the equity courts refused to specifically enforce an arbitration agreement”).
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voiced at earlier points. Likewise, the progressives recognized that this
increasingly intense battle was not so much about facilitating voluntary
alternative dispute resolution options as enabling big businesses to avoid
accountability to customers and workers and the like; they fell into line,
solidly behind Justice Stevens.
The watershed case was Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.195 The 5–4
decision held that the FAA permitted employers to include binding
mandatory arbitration requirements into employment contracts and
preempted state laws banning or regulating such provisions.196 In dissent,
Justice Stevens methodically reviewed the “extensive and well
documented” “history of the Act.”197 He demonstrated in detail that
neither the history of the drafting of the original bill by the ABA, nor the
records of the deliberations in Congress during the years preceding the
ultimate enactment of the Act in 1925, contain any evidence that the
proponents of the legislation intended it to apply to agreements affecting
employment.198

Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion avoided confronting Justice
Stevens’s exegesis of the legislative history by invoking Scalian “textualist”
logic: “As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the text,” Justice
Kennedy wrote, “we need not assess the legislative history . . . .”199
Justice Stevens skewered the majority’s excuse for “[p]laying ostrich
to the substantial history behind [the provision of the statute on which the
decision turned].”200 Justice Kennedy’s opinion asserted that § 1 of the Act,
which excluded from its coverage labor agreements of “seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce,”201 to so unambiguously limit its exemptive scope exclusively to
transportation workers that resort to legislative history was inappropriate.202
Justice Stevens spotlighted that credibility-straining claim as illustrating
how, in practice, the conservatives’ textualist algorithm can be manipulated
into a cover for displacing statutory purpose with their own agenda: “A
method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and
hence unconstrained,” he wrote, “may produce a result that is consistent
with a court’s own views of how things should be, but it may also defeat the
very purpose for which a provision was enacted.”203 Finally, Justice Stevens
195

532 U.S. 105 (2001).
See id. at 109, 121–22.
197
Id. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198
Id. at 126.
199
Id. at 119 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy also avoided responding to Justice Souter’s
compelling elaboration of the legislative history of the FAA in his lengthy dissent.
200
Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201
9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (emphasis added).
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Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
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Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196
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spotlighted the real-world issues at stake: the Court’s “refusal to look
beyond the raw statutory text” constituted “misus[e] [of] its authority,” for
in doing so, it avoids acknowledging the policy concern behind the Act’s
exclusion for employment agreements—namely, fear of “the potential
disparity in bargaining power between individual employees and large
employers . . . .”204 He concluded, “When the Court simply ignores the
interest of the unrepresented employee, it skews its interpretation with its
own policy preferences.”205
In the decade since Circuit City, the floodgates that the decision has
opened have yielded a veritable tidal wave. Now, for most Americans,
mandatory binding arbitration provisions pop up, or more often lie hidden
in fine print, in every conceivable sort of agreement they are obliged to
sign—to take a job, obtain telephone service, enroll a parent in an assisted
living facility, visit a hospital emergency room, purchase a product, open a
bank account; the list could go on and on.206 And the Court’s conservatives
have kept pace. They have continually ratcheted up their commitment, in
Justice Stevens’s terms, to “skew” FAA jurisprudence into a tool of their
own pro-corporate “policy preferences.” Not only has the majority worked
to eliminate all forms of state restrictions on companies’ power to make
binding arbitration the exclusive mode of enforcing legal rights, but the
conservative Justices have even sought to micromanage the actual conduct
of arbitration and prevent arbitrators from interpreting agreements in ways
that run seriously counter to the interests of the companies which drafted
them.
Thus, in the 2009 case of 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,207 the
conservative Justices confirmed their indifference as to whether victims of
law violations have in fact meaningfully consented to forego a judicial
remedy. 14 Penn Plaza held that individual lawsuits under federal and state
workplace antidiscrimination laws must be dismissed when a governing
collective bargaining agreement prescribes union–employer arbitration as
the exclusive remedy for individual members’ grievances;208 the case
effectively overruled precedents that recognized that entrusting to unions
exclusive power to vindicate statutory individual and minority rights was
tantamount to leaving the fox to guard the henhouse.209 In dissent, Justice
204

Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
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Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical
Comparison 2 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 65, 2003) (“From 1995 to 1997, the General
Accounting Office found that the percentage of employers using arbitration for employment disputes
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60%.” (footnote omitted)).
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Id. at 251.
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Id. at 281–85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Stevens seared “the Court’s subversion of precedent to the policy favoring
arbitration . . . .”210 In 2010, during Justice Stevens’s last term, the familiar
five-Justice majority reversed a Second Circuit decision that had affirmed
an arbitration panel’s (the panel was selected by the parties themselves)
interpretation, over strenuous objections from the business defendant in the
controversy, of an arbitration agreement to provide for class arbitration of
multiple related antitrust claims. The agreement’s text did not expressly
address the class arbitration issue.211 While thus constraining arbitrators’
authority to interpret the terms of arbitration agreements, the conservative
bloc went to the opposite extreme in another case during the same 2009–
2010 term. In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson the Court held that the
arbitrator, rather than a court, should resolve a party’s claim that the
arbitration agreement was invalid—hence, the arbitrator without legal
authority to preside or decide—under applicable (and not preempted) state
law;212 otherwise stated, the arbitrator, however qualified or however
balanced the method of her selection, has final authority to decide on her
authority to decide. The common pattern here appears to be that the
conservative Justices will zealously protect the authority of arbitrators,
except when the arbitrators interpret agreements in ways significantly
adverse to business interests, such, for example, as permitting small
claimants to aggregate claims to make it economically feasible to assert
them.
In 2011, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in that Term’s most
significant arbitration decision, delivered an opinion that is a virtual rogues’
gallery of the conservatives’ manipulative interpretive techniques for
“skewing” statutes to match their “policy preferences.” The decision, AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, involved the question of whether the FAA
preempts a California statute that authorizes state courts to refuse to enforce
any contract found “to have been unconscionable at the time it was made,”
or to “limit the application of any unconscionable clause.”213 The Ninth
Circuit had determined that California’s state law, as construed by its
Supreme Court, required invalidation of a class-action-waiver provision in
the mandatory arbitration agreement that plaintiff Concepcion had signed in
2006 when obtaining wireless phone service from defendant AT&T
Mobility; the waiver required consumer signatories to submit all claims in
arbitration and as individuals rather than class representatives or members,
and it forbade arbitrators to “consolidate more than one person’s claims” or
to “otherwise preside over any form of a representative or class

210

Id. at 274 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775–77 (2010).
212
130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778–79 (2010).
213
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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proceeding.”214 Further, the Ninth Circuit upheld this state law on the
ground that it fell within an exemption in the FAA expressly providing that
arbitration agreements covered by the Act can be invalidated, revoked, or
not enforced “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”215 Unconscionability, as in the California
statute, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, was precisely the sort of equitable basis
for revoking or declining to enforce contracts that the drafters of the FAA
had in mind when they adopted that provision.216 And AT&T Mobility
involved the sort of facts precisely targeted by the California law: plaintiffs
in the case alleged that they had purchased wireless service advertised by
AT&T Mobility to include the provision of free handsets with no warning
that they would be charged $30.22 in sales tax. 217 The California Supreme
Court had held the California unconscionability law specifically applicable
when a class action waiver, like the one in AT&T Mobility’s arbitration
form agreement, is:
found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes
between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,
and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large number of consumers out of
individually small sums of money, . . . the waiver becomes in practice the
exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful
injury to the person or property of another.’ Under these circumstances, such
waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be
enforced.218

Justice Scalia did not dispute the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that
unconscionability is, as prescribed by the text of the FAA, a ground existing
“at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”219 Nor did he deny
that the California law rests squarely within that statutory exemption.
Evidently, the text of this exemption is so clear that Justice Scalia chose not
to use the tactic he has in other instances where the most plausible and
intended meaning of text produces a disagreeable result—i.e., go to
imaginative lengths to conjure an alternative interpretation of that text.220
214

Id. at 1744 & n.2 (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. at 1744–45 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (internal quotation mark omitted).
216
Id. at 1745.
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Id. at 1744.
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Id. at 1746 (alteration in original) (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100,
1110 (Cal. 2005) (quoting § 1668)). The policy behind the California statute—protecting individual
consumers in contract-of-adhesion situations—is precisely the policy attributed by Justice Stevens to the
FAA’s employee agreement exclusion provision in his dissent in Circuit City. See Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219
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220
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Instead, he went over to what, for a devout conservative textualist, is the
heart of the dark side: ignoring the plain meaning of statutory words for
“[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA.”221 Justice Scalia described this
“purpose,” (which, he asserted without so much as a gesture of explanation,
is “evident in the text” of three sections of the FAA) as “to ensure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings. Requiring the availability of classwide
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus
creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”222
Here, Justice Scalia, who has been reported to be the first member of
the Court to use the term “chutzpah” in an opinion, certainly confirms that
he understands what that word means.223 He has attributed a purpose of
empowering all businesses to bar anyone with whom they deal from
seeking any form of class remedy, whether judicial or arbitral, to a near
century-old statute, enacted before class actions, let alone class arbitrations,
were known—certainly to the members of Congress that enacted it. And he
conjured this extravagant interpretation in the face of an express provision
in the statute itself that plainly authorizes state laws, like California’s, that
preserve class remedies on unconscionability grounds.
Further, Justice Scalia emphasized that the vice of the California
statute is not that the contract of adhesion evils it addresses are not real or
widespread. On the contrary, Justice Scalia wrote, “the times in which
consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”224
And it is precisely because contracts of adhesion are ubiquitous, he
continued, that the FAA’s “overarching purpose” precludes states from
undertaking any measures to remedy their acknowledged evils which could
give companies “less incentive” to continue to use case-by-case arbitration
as their preferred approach to “resolving potentially duplicative claims.”225
Noting that “class arbitration greatly increases risks to [corporate]
defendants,” Justice Scalia effectively ruled that alleviating those risks must
offset the benefits that class relief options could bring for consumers and
other individuals.226 Defending this naked policy preference, he
acknowledged, without disputing, the observation of Justice Breyer, who
wrote the dissent on behalf of the four progressive Justices, “that class
proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might
otherwise slip through the legal system.”227 To that point, Justice Scalia
221
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responded, “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the
FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”228 Justice Scalia
recognized that the sweeping preemption contemplated in this dictum—of
any state law that might reduce the desirability or frequency of arbitration
procedures or impose requirements inconsistent with the conservative
bloc’s notions of the inherent nature and attributes of arbitration—cannot be
based on actual conflict between the text of the FAA and hypothetical state
laws not even before the Court. So Justice Scalia resorts to the branch of
preemption jurisprudence that is least tethered to identifiable statutory
prescription—“obstacle preemption.”229 “Because,” Justice Scalia concludes
his opinion, California’s rule “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’ . . . [it] is
preempted by the FAA.”230
In sum, the conservative bloc’s conversion of the FAA into a radically
preemptive “edifice of its own creation” appears at this point to be perhaps
their single boldest and most far-reaching doctrinal weapon for
undermining progressive legislation. It may also be the sector where
manipulation and even subordination of their own, supposedly most sacred
jurisprudential principles is most vividly on display, when necessary to
impose results that match conservative policy preferences and favor
conservative constituencies. Certainly, that is the teaching of AT&T
Mobility, Circuit City, and other major arbitration decisions over the past
decade.
V. CONTEMPT FOR CONGRESS: THE CONSERVATIVE BLOC SETS “RULES
OF ENGAGEMENT” THAT MAKE CONGRESS FAIL
Thus far this Article has reviewed the multiple ways in which the
Supreme Court’s conservative Justices have, in Justice Stevens’s words,
“skewed” their approaches to interpreting individual statutory provisions in
order to “defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted” and

228

Id. at 1753 (emphasis added).
The doctrine of “obstacle preemption” allows the Supreme Court to strike down state laws that
stand as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The doctrine has split Justice Thomas from his
conservative allies on the court; while Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Scalia have
promoted the rule, Justice Thomas has called the doctrine a “freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a
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than the courts that pre-empts state law.” Pharm. Research & Mfg. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 682
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Gade
v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)); accord Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling, Extratextual
Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Clarence Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. &
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substitute their own “view[] of how things should be.”231 As might be
expected, given the scope and systematic character of these efforts, not far
from the surface of the conservatives’ penchant for twisting and
undermining specific laws enacted by Congress resides hostility to
Congress itself. It is unsurprising that these men of the right would feel (and
from time to time manifest) antagonism toward the Congresses and
legislators responsible for enacting laws out of sync with their own policy
preferences. More significant perhaps, they also display hostility to the
institution itself and to the process through which legislative decisions are
made. As noted above, early in Justice Stevens’s career, and before he
joined the Court, the view he consistently stressed of the Court’s role vis-àvis Congress was the prevailing view; the Court must be the “faithful
agent” to Congress’s principal, assigned to discover, interpret, and
faithfully execute its purposes. That is not so clearly a consensus view
anymore. Increasingly, the conservative bloc appears to see Congress as a
political adversary and institutional rival, and to manipulate the relationship
not only by giving short shrift to individual pieces of Congress’s
handiwork, but by adopting strategies that impair Congress’s institutional
capacity to perform its function or make its will prevail. This Part will
sketch the Court’s prosecution of this undeclared but currently escalating
turf war.
The conservative Justices’ skepticism toward Congress has been
encouraged, reinforced, and, indeed, rationalized by academic
conservatives, significantly through the propagation of public choice
theory. Public choice theory casts legislatures not as instruments for
expressing the popular will but as arenas in which self-seeking legislators
and organized special interests rig an inherently irrational process to serve
their own ends.232 To the extent that this picture is accurate, judges need not
obsess about their “countermajoritarian difficulty,” as they were encouraged
to do by the conventional wisdom in the middle of the twentieth century.
Just because Congress’s members are elected, judges need not defer to them
as inherently the more reliable exponents of the popular will or the public
interest. Specifically, public choice theory appears to mesh well with the
contempt that Justice Scalia in particular frequently voices for taking
231

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Compare WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN
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seriously, let alone faithfully prioritizing in his decisions, the noble
purposes attributed to statutes in preambles to bills or sponsors’ speeches.
This Part will briefly identify and summarize several manifestations of
the conservative Justices’ hostility to Congress and their pattern of
undermining Congress’s capacity to perform its democratic role effectively.
A. Conservatives’ Refusal to Consider Legislative History Prevents
Congress from Providing Guidance for Implementing Complex Statutes and
Impedes Congress’s Ability to Rely on Specialized Committees and Staff
As noted above, conservative textualists insist that judges not consider
any explanations of statutory provisions in committee reports or other
reliable forms of legislative history. By so doing, they not only confer on
themselves a method of interpretation that is, in Justice Stevens’s terms,
“deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained,”233 they also oblige
Congress to fill the text of statutes with granular details of anticipated
contingencies and dictate their resolution. Even if this were a sensible mode
of governance for either courts or legislatures—which, manifestly, it is
not—it would be infeasible. Congress’s modus operandi must realistically
accommodate the limits on legislators’ and staffs’ time, the demands of
other priorities, and inherent limits of human imagination and language. All
these inherent constraints require that, to achieve the purposes of laws
intended to manage often complex, long-term problems, legislators have no
option but to identify the general purposes behind statutory provisions, to
spotlight types of circumstances in which they expect the legislation to be
applied, and to provide such guidance as seems appropriate to citizens,
administrators, and judges who will be responsible for implementing the
law. This essential function cannot be performed without committee reports
and other authoritative materials not found in the text of statutes.
Conservative textualists’ across-the-board hostility to legislative history in
all forms impairs Congress’s capacity to perform that function.
In addition to undercutting Congress’s capacity to provide appropriate
guidance for implementation of laws, conservative textualists’ blanket
hostility to legislative history deprives Congress of the ability that any
organization, let alone one charged with Congress’s massive political and
substantive challenges, must have to delegate to subgroups of its members,
and to staffs, and to rely on their specialized expertise. In a remarkable
passage in A Matter Of Interpretation, Scalia not only disapproves of the
manner in which Congress goes about its business, but also shows his
contempt for the competence, conscientiousness, and work ethic of its
members:
In earlier days, when Congress had a smaller staff and enacted less legislation,
it might have been possible to believe that a significant number of senators or
233
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representatives were present for the floor debate, or read the committee
reports, and actually voted on the basis of what they heard or read. Those days,
if they ever existed, are long gone. . . . [A]s for committee reports, it is not
even certain that the members of the issuing committees have found time to
read them . . . .234

Justice Scalia’s remedy is to require Congress to operate without reliance
on these newfangled expert committees and staffs. And he considers this
view not simply a matter of personal taste in internal organizational
management methods, nor an indulgence of his own personal libertarian
nostalgia for those simpler “earlier days.” For Congress to “leave to its
committees the details of its legislation,” he says, is “unconstitutional,”
because Article I legislative authority is “nondelegable.”235 In fact, of
course, it is impossible to imagine how Congress could—now or ever—
operate without delegating to its committees the details of legislation.
Of course, the committees’ products do not become law until the
members of both houses vote for them and the President signs the bill. And
of course, as Justice Scalia states, committee reports are not, at least not
ordinarily, voted on by the full House or Senate, and therefore cannot be
“binding” as statements of law. But this is a red herring. No one contends
that committee reports constitute the law themselves or create unrebuttable
interpretations of the law. All that Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer, Senator
Hatch, and Justice Scalia’s many other thoughtful critics claim is simple
and limited, but sensible and essential: as all involved in the legislative
process accept, committee reports can, when used responsibly, be an
authoritative exposition of the committee majority’s broader or more
detailed understanding of the purposes and background of legislation. As
such, they can provide useful guidance for those charged with
implementing it. By insisting that he and his conservative colleagues will
only grudgingly, rarely, and arbitrarily look to committee reports or other
legislative history for such guidance, Justice Scalia hampers Congress’s
ability to delegate rationally and embrace the work of specialized
committees and staffs as sound exposition of its objectives and
expectations.
B. Conservatives Scuttle Rational Basis Deference and Override
Congressional Factfinding.
A particularly telling manifestation of the conservative bloc’s interest
in reducing Congress’s stature and undermining its effectiveness as an
institution has been their departures from the strong post-New Deal precept
that courts must respect legislative policy choices when they have a
“rational basis” in terms of serving constitutionally valid goals. The most
234
235
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overt and flagrant instance of this trend occurred as part of the late 1990s
“federalism” campaign. As noted above, the Court held that, when carrying
out its express authority to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
must enact laws that are “congruent and proportional” to the goals they
target and the problems that they purport to address.236 This standard
appeared to give Congress less latitude to choose means to implement the
Reconstruction amendments—and likewise appeared to give courts broader
authority to reject those means—than the “rational basis” standard long
applicable to legislation implementing constitutional provisions other than
the Reconstruction Amendments.237 Assigning Congress comparatively less
authority under the Reconstruction Amendments seems an improbable
conclusion to derive from their text, since they specifically empower
Congress to “enforce” them via “appropriate legislation.”238 In contrast,
other constitutional powers are implemented by Congress under a general
grant of authority to enact laws “necessary and proper for carrying [them]
into Execution.”239 And indeed, through 2002, in every one of the Court’s
decisions applying its new congruent and proportional standard, all but one
of them decided by a 5–4 margin, the Court struck down the federal law
under review.240
Because, as noted above, the Court has not for the past several years
extended its constitutional federalism doctrines, the status of the “congruent
and proportional” test is not entirely clear. Also, as noted above, Justice
Stevens in 2004 effectively reinterpreted “congruent and proportional” so
that it no longer appeared necessarily to differ materially from “rational
basis.”241 However that may be, the initial, pre-2004 restrictive applications
of the doctrine spotlight the conservatives’ willingness to cut back
Congress’s historic discretion and micromanage its policy choices. The
Rehnquist Court’s “congruent and proportional” exercise remains highly
portentous. Justice Stevens was by no means engaging in hyperbole when
he wrote that this and other incidents of the Rehnquist Era federalism
jurisprudence were “fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers’
conception of the constitutional order.”242
The same indifference to the reasonableness of Congress’s policy
choices has appeared in the conservatives’ cavalier treatment of its
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factfinding. A flagrant example was Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett, discussed above, in which the five conservatives
reinforced draconian application of their congruent and proportional test
with tendentious dismissal of Congress’s factual basis for the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), the legislation under review.243 Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion for himself and his four colleagues on the Court’s right
conceded that the record Congress assembled in enacting the ADA
“includes many instances to support” its finding that “historically, society
has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,
and . . . discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue[s] to be
a serious and pervasive social problem.”244 But, Chief Justice Rehnquist
asserted, this “general” finding did not support subjecting state government
entities to suits by victims of disability discrimination, because “the great
majority of these incidents [in Congress’s record] do not deal with the
activities of States” as opposed to private sector employers.245
As Justice Breyer caustically observed in his dissenting opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning was patently specious, since “state agencies
form part of that same larger society” in which the record showed
disability-based discrimination was pervasive, and “[t]here is no particular
reason to believe that they are immune from the ‘stereotypic assumptions’
and pattern of ‘purposeful unequal treatment’ that Congress found
prevalent.”246 Underscoring the majority’s institutional disrespect for
Congress, Justice Breyer observed that they “[r]eview[ed] the congressional
record as if it were an administrative agency record” and noted that they
simply brushed aside a “vast legislative record” comprising thirteen
congressional hearings, its own prior experience over forty years enacting
less far-reaching but similar legislation, and the creation of a special task
force that held hearings in every state, attended by more than 30,000
people.247
The conservative majority’s high-handed result and rationale in
Garrett induced The New York Times’ Linda Greenhouse to observe that
“the Supreme Court’s real concern with the way power is allocated in the
American political system [is] less the balance between the federal
government and the states than that between the Supreme Court and
Congress.”248 Greenhouse noted that, unlike some of the other laws rejected
by the Rehnquist Court on federalism grounds, the ADA was “the most
important civil rights law of the last quarter-century, was the highly visible
243
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product of a bipartisan legislative process,” and the product of “years
compiling a record of the extent of discrimination against people with
disabilities.”249 The bottom line, this veteran Supreme Court correspondent
concluded, was that
The exercise of power is largely a zero-sum game, and the court, defining the
rules of engagement to give itself the last word, is winning at the expense of
Congress.250

Similar disrespect for Congress’s factfinding bristled from the Court’s 2009
decision to impose a strained construction of the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
avoiding a determination that the statutory section at issue, containing the
Act’s “preclearance” provisions, was unconstitutional.251 The decision
provoked bipartisan anger at a House Judiciary Committee oversight
hearing on the case. Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), who had
chaired the Committee when it voted to reauthorize the Act in 2006, testily
asked witnesses what more Congress could do, after holding twenty-one
hearings with 16,000 pages of testimony.252 Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion acknowledged Congress’s “sizable” factual demonstration of
persistent voting discrimination in the (predominantly Southern)
jurisdictions covered by the original VRA.253 But, he said, Congress should
have considered writing an altogether different law covering other regions
with possible similar voting discrimination deficiencies.254 In other words,
Congress had a rational basis for the solution it chose to enact. But the
Chief Justice and the Court ruled that Congress should have picked a
different problem to solve.255
“Things have changed in the South,” Chief Justice Roberts proclaimed
in his opinion, repeating an insight he initially offered during the oral
argument.256 Although apparently important to him, this judgment about
contemporary political sociology is manifestly one not for the Court, but is
instead left for Congress to make. In Congress, of course, the South is
strongly represented, and Southern representatives had overwhelmingly
249
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voted for reauthorization of the Act and the preclearance provision,
notwithstanding Chief Justice Roberts’s insistence that it was no longer
needed.257 Further, Chief Justice Roberts’s pronouncement was quite beside
the point. The relevant legal question was not whether African-American
ballot access had improved since 1965, but whether Congress had evidence
that persistent racial polarization in covered jurisdictions carried continued
risk of racially motivated manipulation of election procedures. On that
point, Chief Justice Roberts himself indulged in manipulation of the record
before the Court. To buttress his attack on continued preclearance of
election law changes in the covered jurisdictions, he quoted out of context
from a 2007 law review article by Columbia Law School election law
expert Nathan Persily.258 At the same time, he declined to mention an
amicus curiae brief filed in the case itself by Professor Persily. After
exhaustively reviewing data from the 2008 elections, this brief concluded
that “the 2008 election revealed the intransigence of racial differences in
voting patterns.”259 Specifically, the brief stated that, in this election, with
an African-American presidential candidate on the ballot, racial polarization
in the covered jurisdictions grew relative to noncovered jurisdictions:
“[W]hites of every partisan affiliation in the covered jurisdictions were less
likely to vote for Obama than were their copartisans in the noncovered
jurisdictions,” adding that “[i]n several of the covered states, he did worse
among white voters than the Democratic nominee four years earlier.”260
In sum, Congress’s factual findings matched up well with facts on the
ground and provided more than ample rational basis for its bipartisan 2006
decision to retain preclearance for previously covered jurisdictions in
reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act. As Representative Sensenbrenner
suggested, Chief Justice Roberts here demonstrated that he and his
colleagues are not averse to making it literally impossible for Congress to
find and marshal facts sufficient to justify legislation promoting policies
257
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that a majority of the Court strongly disapproves. As Justice Stevens
observed, if Congress’s facts don’t match the Court’s preferences, the
justices will simply go with their own “view[] of how things should be.”
C. Moving the Goal Posts to Defeat Congress’s Reasonable Expectations
When crafting adversarial interpretive “rules of engagement,” as Linda
Greenhouse aptly put it, the Court has not infrequently compounded
damage to Congress’s ability to function effectively by changing those rules
abruptly, unpredictably, and retroactively—often applying them to
congressional actions taken decades before. The conservative Justices have
upended rules that they themselves have recently put in place and on which
Congress has expressly relied. By thus constantly reformulating applicable
tests, stiffening old requirements, and inventing new ones, the Court has
armed itself with a highly effective weapon—“moving the goal posts” to
defeat congressional objectives and intent, and in the process further
undermining Congress’s ability to legislate effectively.
Professors Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, in their treatise, have noted
the emergence of this moving-the-goal-posts pattern, which they label “bait
and switch.”261 They cite a particularly egregious instance, in which
Congress in 1986 amended the abrogation provision in the Education of the
Handicapped Act, valid under standards prevailing when it was enacted in
1975.262 Congress clarified the provision to meet the Court’s new “clear
statement” test, prescribed in a 1985 decision, for specifying Congress’s
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in connection with legislation
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.263 In 1989, the Court determined that
this amendment was not sufficient to abrogate sovereign immunity with
respect to matters arising prior to 1986, when the clarifying amendment was
added to the law—although its own decision stiffening abrogation clear
statement requirements postdated the situation that gave rise to the
litigation.264
Such zeal for defeating Congress’s reasonable expectations was not
always characteristic of the Court’s posture toward the legislative branch. In
the 1970s and early 1980s, for example, the Court, with the concurrence of
liberal as well as conservative Justices, sought to establish workable criteria
for determining when private judicial remedies would be permitted in the
absence of express statutory rights of action.265 Initially, the Court avoided
retroactive imposition of such new standards. In 1982, Justice Stevens made
the commonsense observation that, if the goal is to effectuate Congress’s
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intent “[w]hen Congress acts in a statutory context in which an implied
private remedy has already been recognized by the courts . . . the question is
whether Congress intended to preserve the pre-existing remedy.”266
But that notion of respecting Congress’s actual intent in such cases did
not survive succeeding rounds of Republican appointments to the Court. In
2001, Justice Scalia dismissed Justice Stevens’s 1982 solicitude as a relic of
the discarded ancien régime of presumptive hospitality to federal rights of
action.267 Justice Scalia shrugged off 1980s precedents honoring the
“‘expectations’ that the enacting Congress had formed in light of the
contemporary legal context.”268 He brusquely denied that the Court had ever
given such expectations, however reasonable, “dispositive weight.”269
Justice Stevens continued to spotlight the conservative majority’s doublecrossing approach. In 1999, Justice Stevens targeted the conservative
majority’s invention of a new, unanticipatable barrier to legislation
carefully drafted to surmount the hurdle the Court had previously imposed:
It is quite unfair for the Court to strike down Congress’[s] Act based on an
absence of findings supporting a requirement this Court had not yet articulated.
The legislative history . . . makes it abundantly clear that Congress was
attempting to hurdle the then-most-recent barrier this Court had erected in the
Eleventh Amendment course . . . .270

In June 2009, at the end of Justice Stevens’s second-to-last Term, the
conservative bloc added what one might call a “gotcha” wrinkle to their
practice of defeating congressional purposes and intent with unpredictable
retroactive interpretive approaches. This 5–4 decision, Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., erected a new procedural obstacle for plaintiffs
seeking to prove workplace age discrimination under the 1967 Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).271 The new rule gravely
weakened age discrimination protections; many or possibly most age
discrimination victims will find the new barrier insurmountable, and many
potentially valid claims will never be filed.272 The decision startled
observers on all sides because the new ADEA standard differed from a
more lenient standard applicable to other, non-age-based types of
266

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378–79 (1982).
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001).
268
Id. at 287–88 (internal quotations omitted).
269
Id. at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to Merrill Lynch, other Supreme Court
decisions honoring congressional “expectations” regarding an implied private right of action, and
derided by Justice Scalia in Sandoval, include Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 710–11
(1979) and Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988).
270
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 654 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The Eleventh Amendment hurdle to which he referred was the clear statement
rule of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
271
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
272
See id. at 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
267

826

106:769 (2012)

Stripping the Gears of National Government

employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act; Title VII had served as Congress’s model in drafting the relevant
ADEA provision.273
The reason given by Justice Thomas’s majority opinion for thus
uniquely obstructing age discrimination claims was that when, in 1991,
Congress inserted language into Title VII codifying a 1989 Supreme Court
decision, it did not include a reference to the ADEA.274 Up until then—
indeed, until the Court’s decision nearly two decades later in Gross—
applicable standards under Title VII and the ADEA were identical.275 Under
this novel interpretive method, legislation strengthening any one federal
law, or merely codifying in that statute any existing case law, would be
deemed to weaken all other federal laws dealing with the same type of
issue, e.g., employment discrimination.
In his vigorous dissent in which he characterized the majority’s
decision as an “unabashed display of judicial lawmaking,” “irresponsible,”
and in “utter disregard” of the Court’s own precedents and “Congress’s
intent,” Justice Stevens observed that weakening employment
discrimination protections was the opposite of what Congress intended in
adopting the 1991 Civil Rights Act.276 Apart from its specific impact on the
ADEA, Justice Thomas’s interpretive approach could complicate
exponentially the already daunting challenge of drafting legislation. In
every instance in which Congress amends any one law, to avoid the risk of
unintended consequences pursuant to the Gross rule, committees will have
to scour the United States Code for all the other laws that would have to be
similarly amended.
D. The Ultimate Snub: The Conservative Bloc Exhumes Decisions that
Congress Overrides
The Gross majority aggressively manipulated a legislative “fix” for
Title VII in the 1991 Civil Rights Act as tantamount to a direction by
Congress to weaken identical language in the ADEA. Specifically, Gross
read into the ADEA an interpretation of Title VII proposed by Justice
Kennedy in dissent from the 1989 decision;277 Justice Kennedy was a
member of the Gross majority.278 This case does not, however, represent the
conservative Justices’ most extreme level of misreading congressional
responses to the Court’s statutory interpretations. When overridden, the
conservative Justices have construed the legislative fix under review as
narrowly as possible, treating it as revising the law only for purposes of the
273
274
275
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precise circumstances and result of the targeted decision. Without missing a
beat, they have kept right on treating overridden decisions as precedent and
applied the same rationale rejected by Congress in equivalent (if not
precisely identical) contexts.
The most notorious example of this zeroing out of congressional
overrides is the 2007 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. decision
discussed above.279 In Ledbetter, not only did the conservative majority give
the Title VII statute of limitations provision a cramped interpretation
calculated to defeat the statute’s substantive purpose, as noted above, they
also imposed this crippling interpretation despite the fact that in the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1991, Congress had overridden a 1989 decision
that adopted precisely the same interpretation of the same statute of
limitations provision.280 The overridden 1989 decision was Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc..281 In Lorance, a group of women employees
challenged a seniority system that, they alleged, discriminated against
women and was adopted for discriminatory reasons.282 Several years after
the system was put in place by AT&T, layoffs occurred based on its
provisions.283 The women’s Title VII challenge was rejected by the
Supreme Court on the same theory invoked in Ledbetter, that the statutory
180-day limitation period ran from the initial discriminatory decision
(establishing the seniority system), not from the last injury-causing act
generated by the unlawful decision.284 Here is the override language
Congress wrote into the 1991 Act:
For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with
respect to a seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally
discriminatory purpose in violation of this title (whether or not that
discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision),
when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to
the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application
of the seniority system or provision of the system.285

The Senate Sponsors Memorandum, a bipartisan equivalent of a committee
report describing the Senate floor compromise version of the bill that was
ultimately passed by both houses and signed by President George H.W.
Bush, said that “[t]his legislation should be interpreted as disapproving the
extension of [Lorance] to contexts outside of seniority systems.”286 The
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House Committee Report contained similar language.287 Despite this
express direction to eliminate as precedent the truncated statute of
limitations approach in Lorance, reinforced by other elements in the
legislative history of the 1991 Act, the conservative bloc largely based its
Ledbetter result on Lorance. Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court dismissed
the 1991 override in a footnote as merely designed “to cover . . . liability
arising from an intentionally discriminatory seniority system both at the
time of its adoption and at the time of its application.” 288
In her recent survey of the frequency of the courts’ raising overridden
decisions from their intended graves, Professor Deborah Widiss shows that
this practice—which she labels “shadow precedents”—is not unique to
Ledbetter. Nor is it random that this extreme form of defiance of Congress
appears in an employment discrimination case. On the contrary, she
observes: “Employment discrimination is an area where this problem often
takes center stage because Congress frequently disagrees with Supreme
Court interpretations of Title VII and other employment discrimination
laws.”289 Further, she notes that, since “in recent decades the Supreme
Court’s interpretations in this area have tended to be far more conservative
than those of Congress. Thus, judges may use shadow precedents as
something of a fig leaf for advancing their own policy preferences.”290
Often, the significance of Supreme Court “mistakes” in interpreting
statutes is downplayed because, as it is said, unlike the case of invalidating
statutes outright on constitutional grounds, Congress can always correct
interpretive decisions with which it disagrees. And indeed, sometimes it
does. The 1991 Civil Rights Act overrode twelve separate Supreme Court
decisions narrowly interpreting federal employment discrimination laws, as
noted by Professor Eskridge in a massive empirical study of statutory
overrides two decades ago.291 In 2008, as noted by Professor Widiss,
Congress overrode several decisions narrowly construing the Americans
with Disabilities Act, and in 2009, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
overrode Ledbetter as the first bill that President Barack Obama signed into
law.292
287
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But for reasons these and other scholars have identified, and veteran
participants in the legislative process have experienced many times over, it
is very difficult for Congress to overturn statutory interpretation decisions,
no matter how egregiously antithetical they may be to the purposes of the
enacting Congress. This is especially the case when the Court’s “mistakes”
coincide with the policy preferences of even a significant minority of the
contemporary Congress, or the White House, or with the interests of highly
mobilized interest groups—such as, for example, businesses affected by
employment discrimination issues.293 (Not that willful disdain for
Congress’s products would be defensible, even if the cliché of
comparatively easy correction were accurate.) But the Ledbetter majority’s
penchant for stiffing Congress, even when Congress manages to overcome
the standard obstacles to overriding the Court’s misinterpretations, lights up
their view of Congress as a political adversary and institutional rival. The
flippancy on display in Ledbetter also blazons the conservative Justices’
recognition of Congress’s inherent weakness in sustained duels. The result
underscores the extremes to which they are prepared to go to exploit—and
intensify—Congress’s institutional vulnerabilities in trumping its enacted
policy preferences with their own.
CONCLUSION: CONSERVATIVES’ JEKYLL AND HYDE STATUTORY
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HEALTH REFORM
As noted above, in their treatment of twentieth- and twenty-firstcentury progressive statutes, mainstream judicial conservatives have
sustained a Jekyll and Hyde performance. On issues of substantive
constitutional authority, they have adhered to the post-New Deal, early
nineteenth-century regime prescribing broad congressional discretion to
implement Article I powers, judicial restraint, and, in particular, deference
to Congress’s choice of means to execute its powers. On issues of statutory
293
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interpretation, and to a limited extent on structural constitutional issues
pertaining to “federalism,” the conservative Justices and their allies on the
lower courts have embraced aggressive strategies to defeat progressive
statutory purposes no less “activist” than the conservative doctrines of the
Lochner Era Court.
Will these two contradictory strains continue to coexist, or will one
dominate or replace the other? In all likelihood we should get a good look
at the answer to this question before the end of the 2011–2012 Term. By
then the Court is expected to rule on the lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. The pertinent constitutional
precedents, including major and recent opinions by members of the
conservative bloc, all point strongly toward rejection of the challenges.
Many observers, including eminent conservative scholars and judges, have
confidently argued from this perspective that the ACA should and will be
upheld.294 But if, when contemplating the signature legislative
accomplishment of President Barack Obama and the Democratic 111th
Congress, the conservative Justices feel inclined to let ideology trump
precedent, their statutory jurisprudence provides a roadmap of how they
could go about giving vent to that impulse. The bag of interpretive tricks
examined in this Article includes approaches necessary to rule against the
ACA, in particular its mainly targeted provision, the individual mandate to
carry health insurance or pay a penalty. We have seen how ready and
willing the conservative bloc has been to unsheathe such activist weapons
as: scuttling rational basis deference to Congress’s selection of means to
achieve lawful goals; overriding congressional factfinding, factual, and
policy judgments; and selective and unsympathetic reading of Congress’s
legislative record. If those approaches metastasize from the Court’s
statutory interpretation precedents to its constitutional jurisprudence, the
nation will find itself living under a very different Constitution than the one
we thought we had for many decades.
The outcome is uncertain. But one thing is quite certain. If the
conservative Justices uphold the ACA individual mandate, sticking with
established precedent and their oft-professed commitment to judicial
restraint, a large share of the credit will rest with what Ted Olson termed
the “crafty and genial hand of Justice Stevens.”295 Specifically, the single
strongest precedent for upholding the mandate as a proper exercise of
Congress’s interstate commerce power is Gonzales v. Raich, the 2005 6–3
decision upholding a prosecution under the federal Controlled Substances
Act of a California resident growing marijuana for her own consumption for
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medicinal purposes.296 As noted above, Justice Stevens’s opinion for the
Court detailed the long line of cases establishing Congress’s authority to
reach all matters that it has a “rational basis” for concluding “substantially
affect” commerce.297 In elaborately reprising this history, his manifest
purpose was to ensure that the Court’s long-standing Commerce Clause
jurisprudence would not be seen as having been displaced by two 5–4
Commerce Clause-limiting decisions during the Rehnquist Court’s
“federalism” campaign. And he succeeded. As Chief Justice Roberts
explained in his confirmation hearing, barely two months after the Raich
decision was released, the Court’s opinion meant that these two cases,
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, were merely:
two decisions in the more than 200-year sweep of decisions in which the
Supreme Court has . . . recognized extremely broad authority on Congress’s
part, going way all the way back to Gibbons v. Ogden and Chief Justice John
Marshall, when those Commerce Clause decisions were important in binding
the Nation together as a single commercial unit.298

Seven years later, as Chief Justice, John Roberts will decide whether to
frame this momentous issue the same way that he did during his job
interview with the Senate. Justice Stevens will no longer be on the Court.
But his constitutional vision and democratic commitment will be
omnipresent as the historic case is argued and decided.
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